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This dissertation consists of three essays and fits in the broader literature of how to improve 
public finances in a context of increasing use of electronic means of payments and how to 
efficiently allocate scarce public resources to development programs. Analyzing the latter, the first 
essay evaluates the impact of the 2008-2009 universal primary education policy in Togo on school 
outcomes while the second essay investigates the effect of the same policy on child labor. Finally, 
the third essay examines whether the growing reliance on electronic means of payments stimulate 
public revenues by assessing the impact of plastic money use on value-added tax (VAT) 
compliance in the European Union (EU). 
Entitled “A Tale of a Comprehensive Pro-Poor Education Policy?”, the first chapter sheds 
light on the causal effects of free primary education policies implemented in quite a few African 
countries. Using administrative data on the universe of school districts in Togo from 2005-2017, I 
leverage differences in pre-policy enrollment rates across local areas to identify the impact of the 
policy. I find that the policy significantly spurred primary school completion and graduation, more 
so in areas with low baseline enrollment rates. The graduation rate was not affected, suggesting a 
 
 
non-deterioration in education quality. A likely reason is that school openings and teacher hiring 
increased consistently with the surge in enrollment. Moreover, districts with a rising supply of 
schools and teachers recorded higher number of final graders and graduates. It also appears that 
the intervention has not crowded out private school outcomes. 
As for the second chapter, titled “Does Free Primary Schooling Curb Child Labor? 
Evidence from Togo”, inform the empirical literature on the causal effect of a nationwide 
suppression of public primary school fees on child labor using as case study the 2008-2009 
universal primary education policy (UPEP) in Togo. Using data from the 2006 and 2010 waves of 
the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) in a difference-in-differences approach that 
compares potential beneficiaries of the UPEP to non-beneficiaries before and after the policy, I 
find that the policy would curb the propensity to child labor by about 4-5 percentage point. This 
result is mainly driven by a decline in children’s engagement in non-productive activities. 
However, the policy has not affected children’s likelihood to perform economic activities. This 
finding suggests that a free primary education policy is not sufficient to reduce some types of child 
labor even though it effectively increases school attendance.  
Finally, the third chapter analyzes the impact of credit and debit card usage on consumption 
tax compliance using annual national level data on 26 European Union countries from 2000 to 
2016. Exploiting spatiotemporal variation in plastic money use along with an instrumental 
variables approach, this study finds that a 1% increase in card payments reduces VAT gap by 0.51 
percentage point whereas a 1% increase in cash withdrawals increase VAT gap by 0.6 percentage 
point. This paper’s contribution lies in using more adequate measures of VAT compliance gap and 
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Chapter 1. A Tale of a Comprehensive Pro-Poor Education Policy? 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Education through human capital building has widely been viewed as a key driver to 
poverty alleviation and economic development. However, access to education is limited in Sub-
Saharan Africa even at such a basic level as primary education. Several studies have attributed this 
shortcoming to financial constraints (Petrosino et al., 2012; Krishnaratne et al., 2013; Murnane & 
Ganimian, 2014). In this regard, and in order to achieve universal primary education, quite a few 
developing countries have recently reduced or eliminated school fees as those fees have been found 
to be a major deterrent to educational access (Holla and Kremer, 2008). In this context, the 
Togolese government has also suppressed public primary school fees from the academic year 
2008-2009 onward. What is the impact of this policy on demand- and supply-related school 
outcomes?  
Put in the socioeconomic context, this is a major pro-poor educational reform and, as such, 
it can be saluted if one recalls that 61.7% of Togolese were living with less than a dollar per day 
in 2006 according to the National Institute of Statistics (INSEED). However, the widespread 
extension of education to all social classes can be detrimental to education quality by adversely 
affecting educational outcomes if classrooms construction, teachers hiring, and other 
accompanying measures do not follow the surge in enrollment. In fact, overcrowded classrooms 
would render teaching more challenging since it would be quite difficult for teachers to monitor 
each student’s progress. This, combined with the negative peer effect due to classrooms’ 
overpopulation, would undermine student’s performances. Therefore, the intervention could spur 




in anticipation of a depreciation in education quality due to the impending risk of public school 
classrooms being overcrowded. Overall, the combination of these effects would be reflected in the 
number of students in public and private schools and in their performance on the primary school 
exit exam. The effects on private school supply may also be ambiguous. In fact, while the 
intervention may spur the movement of students from less disadvantaged backgrounds into private 
schools, which may increase the private supply of schools and teachers, it may also introduce some 
distortions in the school supply market by causing some private schools, probably the least 
expensive ones, to close and teachers to be dismissed. 
On the other hand, in a context of limited public resources, governments and taxpayers 
need to know whether these policies are effective or if they should be forgone in profit of other 
relevant policy alternatives which may be more cost-effective. Several development projects 
carried out in developing countries have been financed through increasing and relentless public 
indebtedness. The fact that some of these programs fail or have adverse effects relatively to the 
intended ones constitutes a threat to development insofar as the invested funds must be reimbursed 
or could have been allocated to other more promising projects.  
In consequence, this study has an important implication for the broader literature on public 
finance and development. In this respect, there has been question as to the efficacy of the universal 
primary education policy (UPEP) initiated by the Togolese government in the school year 2008-
2009. However, to the best of my knowledge, no impact evaluation study has been conducted so 
far on this significant pro-poor policy both in the specific context of Togo as well as in the general 
context of West and Francophone Africa. The investigation is all the more important and topical 
and deserves attention if one recalls that just last year, the Democratic Republic of Congo also 




econometric perspective, thereby contributing qualitatively and quantitatively to the literature on 
the effect of such reforms on school outcomes in West and Francophone Africa.  
In fact, the existing literature on Eastern African countries (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012; Grogan, 
2009; Nishimura et al, 2008; Al-Samarrai and Zaman. 2007; Deininger, 2003) is mainly 
correlational. In a nutshell, those studies find that free primary education programs have increased 
enrollment, particularly among students from poorer families, reduced the incidence of delayed 
primary school entry, but also led to a decline in the quality of education. However, as noted by 
Lucas and Mbiti (2012), those studies have mostly relied on cross-cohort differences in exposure. 
Therefore, they might have wrongly attributed unrelated changes over time to the free education 
program.  
Moreover, by excluding private schools from their analyses, some of the existing studies 
abstracted from the potential sorting between public and private schools that might have occurred 
subsequently to such interventions. In this respect, this paper makes an important methodological 
contribution to the existing literature by providing causal evidence of the impacts of such policies. 
By using quasi-experimental methods for identification and by checking the robustness of the 
results to alternative specifications that properly account for the data generating process, this study 
provides reliable causal estimates of FPEPs. I leverage, in a difference-in-differences and triple 
difference settings, changes over time across public and private schools as well as spatial variations 
in the intensity of treatment across local areas to disentangle the effect of the intervention. Unlike 
previous works, this paper looks beyond enrollment outcomes and investigates ultimate demand-
related outcomes such as final grade attainment and graduation as well as supply side outcomes, 




Second, it seeks to evaluate whether there are sizable differences in the effects across local 
areas and gender. In fact, the aforementioned pre-existing socioeconomic conditions are 
exacerbated in the northern part of the country where coexist highest poverty rates, largest sizes of 
households, and lowest net primary enrollment rates. For example, in 2006, 86.7% of the 
population in the Savanes region were living with less than a dollar per day, 74.2% in the Kara 
region, and 74.6% in the Central region with average sizes of households reaching 6 to 7 persons 
in 2011 (INSEED). These localities were also the ones recording the lowest net primary enrollment 
ratios which are 52.6% in the Savanes, and 64.1% in the Kara compared to 80% in the Maritime 
region (INSEED). Given that some local areas were exhibiting relatively low rates of demand for 
schooling prior to the intervention, they will be likely more intensely affected by the reform. It 
then appears important to evaluate the differential effects of the intervention across local areas. 
Moreover, some past cultural beliefs regarding girls’ schooling have not completely 
disappeared, and a financially constrained family may have preference over educating their boys 
than the girls. This is plausible in rural areas. Here lies the interest of examining the effects on the 
demand for schooling across gender. In order to tailor comprehensive policy recommendations, 
this paper, unlike earlier studies which focused mainly on demand-related outcomes, further 
investigates the effect on the supply of schools and teachers and evaluates whether the impact of 
these reforms depend on variations in the supply. By ignoring supply side responses, many 
previous studies would have occulted the stimulative or distortive outcome of such interventions 
on private school supply. 
 To address these questions, I use administrative records of the Togolese Ministry of 
Primary and Secondary Educations on the universe of school districts from 2005 to 2017 as well 




the program has substantially enhanced access to the final grade of primary school as well as the 
number of graduates without affecting the graduation rate. The number of final graders and 
graduates have significantly increased, more so in prefectures with low baseline enrollment rates, 
suggesting a narrowing of the gap in primary school attainment and graduation between children 
from different wealth backgrounds. The effects by gender imply a waning of the gap between boys 
and girls. There is no significant change in graduation rates, suggesting that the intervention has 
not deteriorated public education quality. This result can be due to consistent improvements in 
school openings and teachers hiring, more so in intensely treated areas. I also find that school 
districts that increase their supply of schools and teachers recorded higher number of final graders 
and graduates with, once again, no significant impact on the graduation rate. It also appears that 
the intervention has not crowded out private school supply or demand outcomes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief 
review of the literature on the effects of free education policies in Africa. The third section 
succinctly describes the primary education sector in Togo and the context that prevails to the 
implementation of the free public primary education policy. Section 4 presents the data and 
summarizes the key variables before and after the reform. Section 5 describes the empirical 
methodology. Section 6 exposes the various robustness checks conducted. Section 7 discusses the 
results while the last section concludes with some policy implications. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
Few studies have investigated the effect of school fees cancellation on student performance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Malawi has been a pioneer in implementing free primary education policy 




Zaman (2007) find that enrollment rates have increased dramatically over the 1990s, at both the 
primary and secondary levels, and that these gains have been greatest for the poor.  
Uganda was also among the first Sub-Saharan Africa countries to implement a free primary 
schooling program in 1997. The analysis of the effects of this policy received ample attention. 
Deininger (2003) finds that the universal primary education program in Uganda was associated 
with an increase in primary school attendance; inequalities in attendance related to gender, income, 
and region were substantially reduced; and school fees paid by parents decreased at the primary 
but not at the secondary level. He also noted a general decline in the quality of education. Likewise, 
using data on 940 rural households, Nishimura et al. (2008) find that the Ugandan UPEP decreased 
delayed enrollments and spurred grade completion rates up to the fifth grade, and the effects are 
especially pronounced among girls in poor households. In the same vein, Grogan (2009) found 
that this policy conducted by Uganda has boosted by 3% the probability that a child begins school 
before being 9 years old.  
A common shortcoming to these studies lies in the use of cross-cohort differences in 
exposure, which cannot provide rigorous and reliable estimates of the impact of these policies. 
Besides, they did not examine variations in the supply side, which can help formulate adequate 
policy recommendations. 
In Kenya, Lucas & Mbiti (2012) find that the elimination of primary school fees increased 
the number of students who took primary school exit exam, spurred private school entry, and 
boosted access for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. They argue that the program was 
welfare enhancing as it promoted educational access without substantially reducing the test scores 
of students who would have been in school in the absence of the program. Though causal, this 




for the following reasons. First, since information on graduates are not available, they cannot 
confidently extrapolate the effect on graduation. Having more test takers as results of the policy 
does not necessarily imply an improvement in the number of graduates and even less in the 
graduation rate, which are probably the ultimate demand-related target of the policy. Second, they 
did not consider supply side variables such as teacher hiring and classroom construction. The 
present paper has the advantage of analyzing those outcomes. Third, they did not investigate how 
the demand for schooling reacts to policy-induced changes in supply side variables. This paper 
fills that void by evaluating how growth in school openings and teachers hiring affects student 
outcomes. 
To sum up, these studies find that free primary education programs increased enrollment, 
particularly among students from poorer families, reduced the incidence of delayed primary school 
entry and led to a slight decline in education quality. Fewer policies and studies have focused on 
secondary schools. 
Gajigo (2012) and Blimpo et al. (2015) estimate the impact of girls’ scholarship program 
in the Gambia. The program suppressed school fees for female students attending public secondary 
schools in the implementation regions. Exploiting the gradual geographic rollout of the program 
across regions, they find that the policy has boosted enrollment rates without harming learning 
outcomes. They report a drastic increase of about 50% in the number of girls and boys taking the 
high school exit exam as well as a 0.1 standard deviation gain in test scores as result of the 
intervention. This paper shares the same limitations mentioned earlier for Lucas and Mbiti (2012). 
This study adds to the literature by providing one of the first causal evidence of a large 
scale free primary education policy on ultimate student outcomes such as primary completion and 




teacher supply as well as the effect of supply variations on student outcomes in order to provide a 
more complete view of the impacts of the reform. 
 
1.3. Overview of the Primary Education Sector in Togo and Policy Context 
Togo’s education system is divided into four levels: a three-year pre-school cycle designed 
for 3-5 years old, a six-year primary cycle designed for 6-11 years old, a seven-year secondary 
education cycle designed for 12-18 years old, consisting of a four-year junior level and a three-
year senior level and a higher education system (two public universities and private institutions). 
There are also technical and vocational education at the junior and senior secondary levels and 
literacy programs. The primary cycle education is provided by public and private schools and 
recently also by community schools (EDIL1) with teachers paid by parents. To graduate from 
primary school and earn a primary school diploma, students must take and pass the national 
primary school exit exam at the end of grade 6. 
Over the last decade, Togo has experienced high levels of enrollment compared to the 
observed average in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the sector is confronted to some issues. First, 
the primary completion rate (PCR) was the same in 2009 as it was in 1999 (World Bank, 2010). 
Second, the education system is also experiencing a high level of dropouts that negatively affect 
the completion rate. Only 61% of new entrants complete the primary cycle compared to 71% on 
average in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2010). There is a noticeable discrepancy in primary 
completion rates between boys and girls as well as between rural and urban areas. In fact, in 2006, 
 
 




the PCR for girls was only 61% versus 76% for boys. Disparities between rural and urban areas 
and between levels of family income were even larger. PCR in rural areas was only 60% compared 
to 84% in urban areas. Strong inequalities in completion rates around the national average also 
prevail across the administrative regions. Indeed, the PCR in 2007 ranged from 48% in the Savanes 
region to 95% in the Lomé-Golfe region (Déclaration de Politique Sectorielle, 2009). Lack of 
classrooms and the cost of schooling for households are considered to be the forces driving pupils 
to drop-out. 
In order to tackle these problems, the Government adopted a sector development policy, a 
2010-2020 Education Sector Plan (ESP) and a 2010-2012 Sector Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) for the three first years of ESP implementation. The ESP was officially 
endorsed by all the technical and financial partners and allowed Togo to be admitted to the 
Education for All-Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund (EFA-FTI). Togo received 45 million US 
dollars to support the implementation of the first phase (2010-2012) of the Plan. The ESP’s priority 
objective is to achieve universal primary education by 2020. Aware of the issues faced by the 
primary education sector and in order to make a substantial progress in the Millennium 
Development Goals by achieving the universal primary schooling by 2015, one year before the 
enactment of the ESP, the Togolese government abolished school fees for public schools at pre-
primary and primary levels. A public financial compensation is provided each year to 
counterbalance the loss of resources for schools. Since about 60% of the population was living 
below the poverty line, the policy would have certainly helped reduce school fee constraints for 





1.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To assess the impact of the free primary education on student outcomes and social 
inequality in Togo, I use records of the Togolese Ministry of Primary and Secondary Educations 
on the universe of school districts of the country. The district is the finest level of disaggregation 
that is used for administrative and planning purposes by the Ministry of Primary Education. These 
administrative records are school type-district level data that cover the period 2005-2017 and 
provide information on the type of school (private, public, or EDIL), students’ enrollment at each 
of the six grades of elementary education, the number of primary school exit exam test takers, the 
count of those who pass the exam, the count of private/public schools per district, the number of 
classrooms per type of school, the count of teachers per type of school as well as their 
qualifications, etc. Due to the peculiar features of the EDIL and given that they are relatively 
negligible with respect to public and private schools and because they are absent in most of the 
districts, they are abstracted from in this study. From 44 school districts in the academic year 2004-
2005, the number of districts rose to 61 in 2012 mainly as result of splitting or extending or even 
reducing the jurisdiction of existing districts. Therefore, the overseeing district changes several 
times for some schools. Thus, for consistency, and in order to calculate the treatment intensity 
variables, the observations are collapsed for some districts. In all, there are roughly 1100 school 
type-district-year observations nested in 41 districts. To compute gross enrollment rates defined 
as the number of enrollees divided by the primary school-aged population, the study uses data 
from the 4th Population Census conducted in 2010 by the National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic and Demographic Studies (INSEED). Theoretically, the population aged 6-11 years is 
considered as the primary school-aged population. However, the data show that about 98% of 




age group to compute the gross enrollment rates. The results are however the same if one uses 
instead the 6-11 years old population. The administrative subdivision of the country in the census 
is the prefecture which encompasses potentially one to three school districts. Hence, population 
data are available at the prefecture level. As of 2017, the 61 school districts were nested in 36 
prefectures. Two localities, namely Anie and Mo, which were respectively part of the prefectures 
of Ogou and Sotouboua during the pre-intervention period have been erected in prefecture in 2012. 
The post-reform observations on these newly created prefectures are collapsed with those of the 
prefectures they formerly belonged to. The sample size shrinks to 880 school-type-prefecture-year 
observations when using prefecture-level data. Table 1 presents summary statistics for public and 
private schools before and after the policy. 
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics for Key Variables Before and After the Reform 
Variable Before (2005-2008) After (2009-2017) Percentage change (%) 
Number of enrollees 
   
    Public schools 13,491 21,053 56.1 
    Private schools 7,252 8,467 16.8 
Number of 6th graders 
  
 
    Public schools 1,645 2,319 41.0 
    Private schools 965 1,096 13.6 
Number of test takers    
    Public schools 1,608.07 2,090.33 30.0 
    Private schools 951.21 1,014.40 6.6 
Number of graduates 
  
 
    Public schools 1,151 1,658 44.0 
    Private schools 745 877 17.7 
Number of schools 
  
 
    Public schools 61 93 52.5 
    Private schools 44 43 -2.3 
Number of schools per student    




    Private schools 0.007 0.006 -14.3 
Number of classrooms 
  
 
    Public schools 328 484 47.6 
    Private schools 227 245 7.9 
Number of classrooms per student 
  
 
    Public schools 0.025 0.024 -4.0 
    Private schools 0.031 0.03 -3.2 
Number of teachers    
    Public schools 312 467 49.7 
    Private schools 225 250 11.1 
Number of teachers per student    
    Public schools 0.024 0.023 -4.2 
    Private schools 0.031 0.031 0.0 
Sample size 351 817  
    Public schools 176 413  




    Mean 37.62 16.74 -55.5 
    Median 34.06 16.02 -53.0 
    Sample size 272 612   
Note: Counts are calculated as annual averages at district level over the relevant period. 
While there are noticeable differences in outcomes for public schools before and after the 
intervention, changes for private schools are not substantial. It can be noted an increase in demand 
side variables in public schools after the implementation of the policy. In fact, on average, from 
2009 to 2017, 56% more pupils enrolled in public school compared to the period 2005-2008, 41% 
more attained the final (6th) grade of elementary school relatively to the pre-intervention period, 
30% more took the primary school exit exam, and 44% more graduated from primary school. 
Potential supply responses to the policy are the construction of new schools and teacher hiring. 
Table 1 also shows noticeable increases in the average number of public schools and public school 
teachers after the enactment of the program. In fact, the count of public schools increased by 53% 




number of enrollees, 6th graders, test takers, graduates, schools, and teachers increased for public 
schools after the free primary education policy was introduced in the school year 2008-2009. It is 
worth noting that the count of schools per enrollee and the number of teachers per enrollee did not 
change noticeably, which is a potential safeguard against a deterioration in public school quality. 
Besides, the count of graduates in public schools increased as well, suggesting that the rise in 
enrollment does not necessarily lead to a depreciated public school quality. Figures 1.1 to 1.4 
below show the evolution of school demand outcomes from 2005 to 2017. 






Figure 1.2. Evolution of the Average Number of 6th Graders by School Type 
 







Figure 1.4. Evolution of the Graduation Rate by School Type 
 
There have been also remarkable variations in the non-enrollment rates. The average non-
enrollment rate was about 38% before the policy and declined to nearly 17% afterward, 
corresponding to a 55.5% drop. The median non-enrollment rate shrinks also consistently by 53%. 
Figure 1.5 below illustrates the variations in the pre-policy non-enrollment rates across prefectures. 


















1.5. Empirical Strategy 
In order to capture the effect of the free public primary education policy on school 
outcomes (6th grade attainment, graduation, graduation rate, etc.), this paper adopts two distinct 
strategies. First, it abstracts from the possible substitution between public and private school as 
result of the intervention. In fact, some households at the margin of the income distribution may 
remove their children from public schools in anticipation of a depreciation of the learning 
environment due to the impending risk of overpopulation of classrooms. Likewise, children 
attending the least costly private schools may be redirected by their parents to the henceforth free 
public schools. However, since the dataset is not longitudinal at the student level (but rather at the 
school type-district level), this partial compliance issue cannot be properly addressed. Besides, as 
shown by figures 1.1 to 1.4 above, private school outcomes have been fairly stable across time, a 
suggestive evidence of a moderate sorting across public and private schools. A necessary 
assumption for the difference-in-differences (DD) model to recover causal estimates is that public 
schools and their private counterparts would follow the same trend in the post-intervention period, 
had the public schools not been made free of charge. However, this assumption is untestable since 
the researcher does not observe the counterfactual. The empirical econometric literature instead 
provides evidence on this assumption by evaluating whether pre-reform trends are parallel. Figures 
1.1 to 1.4 provide visual supports of common pre-policy trends in unconditional mean outcomes. 
To statistically test for parallel trends, I compare trends in outcomes across school types over the 
pre-reform period (2005-2008). A non-statistically significant interaction term between the 
treatment indicator and the linear (respectively non-linear) time trends in equation (1.1) would 
suggest common pre-reform trends. 




𝑦𝑠𝑑𝑡 is the outcome (number of 6
th graders, number of graduates, and graduation rate) for school 
type 𝑠 (either public or private) in district 𝑑 in year 𝑡. 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠 is the treatment indicator equal to 1 
if school type 𝑠 is public. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is either a linear time trend or the set of pre-reform year dummies. 
𝑋𝑠𝑑𝑡 represents a set of supply-side variables that may change across school, district, and time such 
as the number of school per student, the count of classroom per pupil, the number of teacher per 
classroom, etc. 𝛿𝑑 represents district-specific time-invariant effects on school outcomes. 𝜏𝑡 
captures year-fixed effects such as nationwide social, political, and economic conditions that affect 
indifferently schools and susceptible to blur the effect of the free primary education policy. 𝜖𝑠𝑑𝑡 is 
the error term assumed to have the usual statistical properties. 
I also explore another way to test for similar pre-policy trends between public and private 
schools. Following Slusky (2016), I conduct a placebo test over the pre-intervention period and 
define the placebo treatment to occur in 2006-2007. The idea is to rule out spurious effects that 
would be mistakenly imputed to the policy. If the common pre-reform trend assumption is 
validated, the difference-in-differences model to be estimated can be specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑠𝑑𝑡𝛼 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑑𝑡    (1.2) 
where all the variables are defined as previously. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for every 
post-intervention year and 0 otherwise. Note that 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is not included in the model except in the 
interaction term since it is perfectly subsumed in the year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by district to account for correlation in the district-level errors over time. In this setting, 





Given potential concerns about the identifying assumptions in the previous setting, in this 
approach, I leverage the additional layer of geographic variations in the intensity of treatment 
arising from differential pre-policy enrollment rates across prefectures to estimate a difference-in-
differences (DD) and a triple difference (DDD) models. Figure 1.5 provides a visual support of 
these variations. The underlying idea is that even though the policy was conducted nationwide, its 
intensity in terms of enrollment would be stronger in prefectures which had low baseline 
enrollment rates. Areas with relatively high pre-reform enrollment rates would potentially 
experience a smaller rise in enrollment than others with lower pre-intervention enrollment rates. 
However, the ultimate effect on 6th grade attainment and graduation is undetermined. In fact, if 
school openings, teachers hiring, and other accompanying measures do not follow the surge in 
enrollment in low pre-treatment enrollment areas, the policy may end up subverting students’ 
learning and the subsequent outcomes. This approach compares pupils from different pre-
intervention enrollment intensity areas before and after the intervention. Finkelstein (2007) uses a 
similar approach to identify the impact of Medicare on health care spending. Miller (2012) also 
adopts this strategy to estimate the effect of the 2006 Massachusetts health reform on emergency 
room utilization without control units. Finally, Courtemanche et al. (2017) uses the same trick to 
analyze the early impacts of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on health insurance coverage in 
Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. The model can be specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑠𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑍𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑍𝑝 ∗
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝑋𝑠𝑝𝑡𝛼 + 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛿𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑝𝑡    (1.3) 
where 𝑦𝑠𝑝𝑡 denotes the outcome for school type 𝑠 (either public or private ) in prefecture 𝑝 in year 




captures school type specific effects; 𝛿𝑝 denotes time-invariant local area unobserved 
heterogeneities; 𝜏𝑡 captures year-fixed effects; 𝜖𝑠𝑝𝑡 represents the idiosyncratic error term, and all 
the remaining variables are defined as before. Note that 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑝 are not included separately 
in the model except in the interaction terms since they are perfectly collinear to the year-fixed 
effects and prefecture-fixed effects, respectively. In this specification, the impact of the policy is 
assumed to vary linearly with the baseline non-enrollment rate. Standard errors are clustered by 
prefecture to account for plausible correlation in the prefecture-level errors over time. 
The identifying assumption in this DDD model is that, in the absence of the free primary 
education policy, any changes that would have occurred in public and private school outcomes 
would not have varied differentially by prefectural non-enrollment rates, which is a weaker 
assumption than that of the first approach. In fact, this approach does not need to assume that 
public and private schools share common counterfactual trends. It only assumes that, to whatever 
extent differential trends may exist, the difference is not related to pre-reform non-enrollment rates. 
To provide suggestive evidence to the validity of this assumption, I evaluate pre-reform trends in 
outcomes across school types and areas with different baseline enrollment rates. I check once again 
the sensitivity of these results by conducting a falsification test that creates a fictitious policy 
intervention in 2006-2007. 
To evaluate the differential effect of the reform across gender, equations (1.1) to (1.3) are 
separately estimated for boys and girls. 
I also exploit district level variations in the supply side to check whether the abolition of 
fees has differential effects on school outcomes depending on the intensity of school openings and 




construction or teacher hiring occurred as result of the free primary education policy. After the 
policy, the supply intensity within a district is the percentage deviation of the supply from its pre-
reform level. To assess how this policy-induced supply growth affects school outcomes, I estimate 
the following model: 
𝑦𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑑𝑡    (1.4) 
where all the variables are defined as previously, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑡 denotes the supply intensity variable 
(either variations in school openings or teachers hiring) in district 𝑑 in year 𝑡. 
 
1.6. Robustness Checks 
The first check performed consists in adding control variables to the different models that 
evaluate the impact on demand for schooling. These controls are mainly supply variables, such as 
the number of schools per enrollee, the count of classroom per student, and the count of classroom 
per teacher, are likely to be affected by the policy. Not controlling for these variables can either 
understate or exaggerate the effect of the intervention. I check the sensitivity of the results to the 
inclusion of these variables. The results are consistent to this manipulation. Second, I control for 
district linear trends as well as school type-district fixed effects. The former accounts for 
potentially confounding existing trends across school districts while the latter controls for school 
type-by-district unobserved heterogeneities such as time-invariant unobserved conditions of each 
district’s public schools. Since all the outcomes except the graduation rate are over-dispersed count 
data, the third specification check repeats all the analyses conducted in section 7.1 by running 
robust Poisson and negative binomial regressions rather than log-linear models. The Poisson 
specification assumes that the data is equidispersed, i.e., its mean and variance are equal. However, 




to deal with this feature is to estimate a negative binomial model which generalizes the Poisson 
model to handle overdispersion (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). For concision, and because the 
Poisson model is a specific case of the negative binomial one, only the results of the latter are 
reported. The results of the former are available upon request. Tables A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A 
present the estimates of the effects of the program using private schools as control. The estimates 
are remarkably close if not equal to those obtained from the log specifications shown in Tables 1.2 
and 1.3. 
I also examine the sensitivity of the prefecture level analyses by adding as previously 
control variables to all the specifications. Second, I estimate as earlier robust Poisson and negative 
binomial models. Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A show that the results are similar to those 
reported in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. Third, I consider a first different way of constructing the pre-
treatment intensity variable by using average prefectural pre-reform non-enrollment rates rather 
than the 2008 prefectural non-enrollment rates. Tables A.9 and A.10 in Appendix A show that the 
estimates are quite close to those obtained earlier implying that the results are robust to this 
manipulation. Finally, I consider a second different way of constructing the local area pre-policy 
non-enrollment rates by using as denominator of the fraction the theoretical 6-11 years old 
population rather than the 5-14 years age group. The results are consistent with those found in 







 This section discusses the results of the free primary education policy on school demand 
and supply outcomes. I start with the results derived from the first identification strategy and end 
with those obtained using the second methodological approach. 
1.7.1. Effect Using Private Schools as Control Units for Public Schools 
Before presenting the results on the impact of the policy in the first setting, I provide 
suggestive visual and statistical evidence of the common pre-reform trends assumption. Figures 
1.1 to 1.4 above suggest that public and private schools exhibit the same trends in unconditional 
mean outcomes on the period 2005-2008 preceding the enactment of the policy. 
Table A.1 in Appendix A provides formal statistical tests of the parallel trend assumption. 
The results are robust to linear and non-linear trends as well as to controlling for various 
confounding factors. In all the cases, the interaction term between the treatment variable (public 
school) and either the time trend or the year dummies are not statistically significant. Thus, the 
null hypothesis that public and private schools followed similar trends in outcomes in the pre-
intervention period cannot be rejected. This suggests that the DD estimates obtained from the 
regressions below can be interpreted causally. 
To evaluate the robustness of these results, I perform a falsification test by creating a 
fictitious policy intervention in 2006-2007. Table A.2 in Appendix A suggests that “placebo” 
interventions during the pre-treatment period are not associated with significant changes in 
outcomes. In fact, the results reported in Table A.2 show that the coefficients associated with the 
interaction between the public school dummy and the linear time trend and the year dummy 




Turning to the effects of the program on school outcomes, the first three columns of Table 
1.2 show that the policy spurred access to the final grade in public schools compared to their private 
counterparts. In all the panels, the coefficient of the interaction between the public school indicator 
and the post-policy dummy is statistically significant at the 1% critical level.  Columns (1) to (3) 
of Panel A indicate that approximately 24 to 26% of pupils per district attain the final year of 
primary school as result of the intervention. The first three columns of Panel B and C report pretty 
similar effects in the subpopulations of boys and girls. It is however worth noting that a linear 














Table 1.2. Effect on Demand Using Private Schools as Control 
  Log (6th Graders)   Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All 
           
Public * Post 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.257*** 
 
0.139** 0.140** 0.146** 
 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.010 
 
(0.054) (0.057) (0.056) 
 
(0.065) (0.067) (0.066) 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
District trends No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
School type-
district FE No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Observations 1061 1061 1061 
 
1061 1061 1061 
 
1061 1061 1061 
R-squared 0.800 0.973 0.974 
 
0.762 0.931 0.931 
 
0.435 0.538 0.540 
Panel B: Boys 
           
Public * Post 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.262*** 
 
0.144** 0.145** 0.157** 
 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.054) 
 
(0.063) (0.065) (0.063) 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
District trends No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
School type-
district FE No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Observations 1061 1061 1061 
 
1061 1061 1061 
 
1061 1061 1061 
R-squared 0.787 0.972 0.972 
 
0.752 0.931 0.932 
 
0.418 0.518 0.521 
Panel C: Girls 
           
Public * Post 0.247*** 0.248*** 0.259*** 
 
0.147* 0.148* 0.143* 
 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.013 
 
(0.058) (0.060) (0.062) 
 
(0.073) (0.076) (0.077) 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
District trends No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
School type-
district FE No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Observations 1061 1061 1061 
 
1061 1061 1061 
 
1061 1061 1061 
R-squared 0.809 0.970 0.970   0.767 0.922 0.922   0.442 0.543 0.546 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, district, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 




The policy has also stimulated primary school completion. In fact, columns (4) to (6) 
suggest roughly 14 to 15% increase in the number of graduates relatively to the pre-policy level. 
Panels B and C report nearly the same effects by gender while a linear model suggest roughly a 4-
percentage point higher impact for girls compared to boys. The universal primary education policy 
has then led to slightly narrow the gap between boys and girls in terms of final grade attainment 
and graduation. Due to some persistent cultural beliefs, some financially constrained households 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have a revealed preference in schooling boys over girls. Since primary 
schooling is now free of charge, it is more likely to trigger girls’ enrollment and graduation, which 
is corroborated by these results. 
However, in order to evaluate whether the policy has a deteriorating effect on education 
quality, I examine changes in graduation rates as well as variations in the supply of schools, 
classrooms, and teachers. The fact that more students are graduating compared to the pre-policy 
level may be misleading if the number of graduates is not reported to the size of the test taking 
cohort. In fact, it may be the case that more students are graduating because more are enrolling. 
As shown by the last three columns of Table 1.2 and suggested by Figure 1.4, the graduation rate 
has not changed significantly in public schools relatively to private schools after the intervention. 
This provides suggestive evidence that the policy has not caused public education quality to 
deteriorate, using the graduation rate as an indicator of education quality. Plausible explanations 
of this result can be found in the school market supply response to the reform.  
First, the supply side can respond to the policy through increasing school infrastructures 
such as school and classroom construction. It is worth noting that schools opened at a higher pace 
than the surge in overall enrollment. In fact, the first two columns of Panel A of Table 1.3 show 




for schooling. Even the number of schools per student increased significantly by 5 schools per 
10,000 pupils (Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B). More classrooms have also been supplied. The 
two middle columns of Panel A of Table 1.3 report that classrooms in public schools increase by 
32% relatively to the baseline district level as result of the FPEP. Besides, the corresponding 
columns of Panel B indicate that, conditional on the number of enrollees, the number of classrooms 
built does not change substantially after the reform. The school market supply would also logically 
respond to the intervention by hiring more teachers since additional schools and classrooms have 
been opened. In fact, the last two columns of Panel A report the recruitment of 36% additional 
teachers per district subsequent to the policy. Interestingly, as for the count classroom per pupil, 
the student-to-teacher ratio has not significantly been affected (Columns (5) and (6) of Panel B). 
Table 1.3. Effect on Supply Using Private Schools as Control 
    (1)   (2)     (3)      (4)    (5)    (6) 
Panel A     Log (Schools)   Log (Classrooms) Log (Teachers) 
Public school * Post 0.4571*** 0.4591*** 0.3184***   0.3204*** 0.3615*** 0.3637*** 
 
(0.057) (0.059) (0.056)   (0.058) (0.049) (0.051) 
District trends     No    Yes     No      Yes    No   Yes 
School type-district FE     No    Yes     No      Yes    No   Yes 
Observations   1061   1061   1061     1061   1061   1061 
R-squared   0.748   0.970   0.760     0.963   0.755   0.962 
       
Panel B School/student Classroom/student Teacher/student 
Public school * Post 0.0005** 0.0005** -0.0012    -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0013 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District trends     No    Yes No        Yes       No Yes 
School type-district FE     No    Yes No        Yes No Yes 
Observations   1061   1061 1061       1061  1061 1061 
R-squared  0.659   0.872 0.518       0.673  0.225 0.300 
Pre-reform mean             0.006                0.028 0.027 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by district, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 




 I also examine if districts with growing supply of schools and teachers experienced higher 
improvements in school demand outcomes. To evaluate how variations in the supply affect school 
outcomes, I estimate equation (4) above. The results are reported in Table 1.4 below. 
Table 1.4. Effect of Supply Variations on School Outcomes 
  Log (6th Graders)   Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Panel A 
        











District trends   No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 
School type-district FE   No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 











        











District trends   No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 
School type-district FE   No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 
 
  No   Yes 





R-squared 0.429 0.960   0.435 0.917   0.403 0.469 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by district, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, district, and year fixed effects. Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
It appears that post-policy variations in the supply of schools and teachers are associated 
with significant positive effects on final grade attainment and the number of graduates. This means 
that districts which experienced a rise in school openings and teachers hiring subsequent to the 
UPEP also recorded higher increases in the number of 6th graders and graduates. This confirms the 




teacher recruitment. There is however no significant change in the percentage of graduates, which 
implies that the number of graduates and the test taking cohort size increase nearly by the same 
proportion. 
1.7.2. Effect Using Differences in Pre-Policy Enrollment Rates Across Prefectures 
This approach exploits, in a triple difference framework, the additional layer of variations 
(spatial variations) arising from differences in the intensity of treatment across local areas to tease 
out the effect of the intervention. The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the free 
primary education policy, changes in outcomes, if any, across school types would not have varied 
differentially by prefectural enrollment rates. However, as aforementioned, this assumption cannot 
be tested since one does not observe the counterfactual. To provide suggestive evidence to its 
validity, I evaluate pre-reform trends in outcomes by school type across areas with different 
baseline enrollment rates. Table A.3 in Appendix A shows the results of the test of parallel pre-
policy trends in outcomes across school types and prefectures with different pre-intervention 
enrollment rates. The coefficients on the interaction term of the pre-policy prefectural non-
enrollment rates (Intensity) and the school type (private or public) are not statistically significant 
over the pre-policy years, suggesting that changes in outcomes across public and private schools 
would not have varied by prefectural non-enrollment rates if the intervention had not occurred. To 
check the robustness of these results, I conduct as previously a falsification test by creating a 
“placebo” policy intervention in 2006-2007. The estimates reported in Table A.4 in Appendix A 
confirm the results obtained in Table A.3. This implies that the subsequent estimates can be 
interpreted as the causal effects of the universal primary education policy. The following table 





Table 1.5. Effect on Demand Across Prefectures and School Type 
  Log (6th Graders)   Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Panel A: All 
       





































Panel B: Boys 
       





































Panel C: Girls 
       
































R-squared 0.861 0.867   0.815 0.821   0.482 0.488 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, prefecture, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 





Table 1.5 reports the results of the impact of the intervention on demand side variables in 
the DDD framework. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A show that the policy has significantly boosted 
the number 6th graders for both public and private schools in areas with low initial enrollment rates. 
In fact, a one-percentage point increase in the pre-reform prefectural non-enrollment rate is 
associated with a rise in the 6th grade access by nearly 2% for public schools per prefecture per 
year. The impact on private schools is also positive and significant but vanishes after controlling 
for some supply side variables. In any case, this is a positive result since private schools also gained 
about 0.9% to 1.5% final graders compared to the pre-policy level. This means that a prefecture 
that records a 10-percentage point rise in exposure to the policy would experience on average a 
20%-rise in the number of 6th graders in its public schools and 9% to 15% in its private schools. 
Panel B and C report a 0.4-percentage point higher increase for public school girls than their male 
counterparts. In fact, about 2.2% more girls access the final grade in low pre-reform enrollment 
areas compared to roughly 1.8%-increase for boys. This suggests a narrowing of the gap in final 
grade attainment between boys and girls across prefectures as result of the FPEP. Since low 
enrollment localities are also in the poorest regions and given that there is merely no difference 
between private school boys and girls, this finding confirms the hypothesis that budget-constrained 
households would have preference over educating their boys, and that the enactment of the policy 
would help girls catch up on their male counterparts.  
Columns (3) and (4) report about 1.3 to 1.4% increase in the count of public school 
graduates in prefectures with high baseline non-enrollment rates. The outcome is also positive for 
private schools though not statistically significant. Once again, this is an interesting result as the 
reform has not led to a decline in the number of private school graduates in different pre-reform 




girls than their male fellows suggesting that the FPEP contributes to narrow the graduation gap 
between girls and boys. A 10-percentage point increase in exposure to the reform leads to 15-16% 
more girls graduating from public school subsequent to the intervention compared to 13-14% for 
boys. 
However, the program has no significant impact on the graduation rate in both public and 
private schools across local areas. This means that the number of graduates is increasing at nearly 
the same pace as the size of the test taking cohort. This result suggests that the UPEP has not led 
to a deterioration of public education quality. A tentative explanation to this result may be found 
in the reaction of the supply of schools and teachers consecutive to the policy. If schools or 
classrooms are not built in low pre-policy enrollment areas, classrooms in existing schools may be 
overcrowded leading to adverse effects such as grade repetition and dropouts. Table 1.6 reports 
the estimates of the effects of the intervention on supply of schools, classrooms, and teachers 




Table 1.6. Effect on Supply Across Prefectures and School Type 
Panel A Log (Schools) Log (Classrooms) Log (Teachers) 
Intensity*Post*Private 0.0023 0.0032 0.0063 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Intensity*Post*Public 0.0160*** 0.0148*** 0.0145*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 880 880 880 
R-squared 0.829 0.838 0.830 
    
Panel B School/student Classroom/student Teacher/student 
Intensity*Post*Private -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intensity*Post*Public -0.0000 -0.0001* -0.0001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 880 880 880 
R-squared 0.659 0.518 0.225 
Pre-reform mean 0.006 0.028 0.027 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, prefecture, and year fixed effects. Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
 
It is worth noting that public schools opened in low enrollment areas at a merely similar 
pace as the rise in final grade enrollment. In fact, the first column of Panel A reports a 1.6% 
increase in the number of public schools in prefectures with 1 percentage point lower enrollment 
rates. Similar impacts are estimated for public school classrooms openings and teachers hiring 
which rose by 1.5% in prefectures with 1 percentage point higher exposure to the reform. 
Interestingly, private schools were also positively affected though not in a statistically significant 




teacher hiring) have not been distorted subsequent to the government’s intervention on the 
schooling market. The ratio number of schools per student has not been significantly affected 
suggesting that school openings consistently increased with the rise in enrollment in low pre-policy 
enrollment localities. However, the teacher-to-student ratio slightly declined in public schools 
without hurting student outcomes. In sum, public schools and public school teachers entered the 
market in prefectures with high pre-treatment non-enrollment rates. 
 
1.8. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper provides one of the first causal evidence of the impact of universal primary 
education policies in Africa. The investigation is both important and contemporary since some 
countries are still embarking in this adventure at the expenses of non-negligible sources of public 
revenue. As such, this study makes a major methodological contribution to the literature on the 
topic and provides in-depth analyses of primary completion and graduation outcomes and 
subsequent supply side variations compared to earlier works on Eastern African countries. 
I find that the intervention has substantially spurred public school outcomes relatively to 
private schools. In fact, the program has significantly increased access to the final grade of primary 
school as well as the count of graduates, leaving unaffected the graduation rate. The policy has 
remarkably boosted the number of final graders and graduates, more so in prefectures with low 
baseline enrollment rates. This suggests a narrowing of the gap between children from different 
wealth backgrounds in terms of primary school attainment and graduation. The effects are slightly 
higher for girls, suggesting a waning of the gap between boys and girls. There is no significant 
change in graduation rates, suggesting that the intervention has not deteriorated public education 




increased consistently with the surge in enrollment, more so in intensely treated areas. I also find 
that school districts with growing supply of schools and teachers experienced higher number of 6th 
graders and graduates with, once again, no significant impact on the graduation rate. It also appears 
that on average the intervention has not distorted private school outcomes. Conversely to some 
countries where the free primary education policy led to the deterioration of education quality in 
public schools, in Togo, public school openings and teachers hiring grew consistently with the rise 
in enrollment, annihilating the negative effect of overpopulated classrooms. Based on the positive 
results from both the demand and supply points of view, it can be concluded that the FPEP in Togo 
was an effective and useful tool to reduce disparities in primary school access, completion, and 
graduation between children from disadvantaged backgrounds and their counterparts from 
relatively wealthier families. 
The findings of this study suggest that a free primary education policy is likely an effective 
tool to reduce the gaps in school attainment and completion between advantaged and 
disadvantaged populations. Such an intervention is more likely to yield significant welfare-
enhancing results if ad hoc accompanying measures namely school openings and teachers hiring 
are taken to counteract the potentially negative effect of classrooms’ overpopulation as result of 
school fees suppression. Therefore, other poor countries envisaging to implement such reforms 
would have to couple them with school and classroom constructions and recruitment of instructors. 
They also need to make sure that areas with initially low levels of enrollment have sufficient 
infrastructures to draw full benefits from the reform. In order not to crowd out private school 
supply outcomes, this government intervention on the school market may need to include a private 
school financing component designed to incentivize relatively low-cost private schools. In fact, 










Chapter 2. Does Free Primary Schooling Curb Child Labor? Evidence from Togo 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Child labor is a major socioeconomic issue facing the developing world in general and 
Sub-Saharan African countries in particular. In order to mitigate the economic vulnerability 
associated with poverty, some households send their children to work. Child labor can interfere 
with schooling and compromise children’s educational achievements as well as their physical, 
mental, and social development, thus jeopardizing their future and their country’s development. In 
conformity with the standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the laws in Togo 
prohibit child labor before the age of 15 years. However, due to their precarious socioeconomic 
conditions, some households allow or request their children to work on family-based farms or 
businesses, to perform street vending, or to work in rock quarries, in mines, in manufacturing 
plants, on building construction sites, etc. Some, especially girls, work as domestic servants, 
risking physical abuse among other issues. Children also engage in prostitution and others become 
victim of child-trafficking. Child labor is prevalent in many African countries especially in Togo 
where one child out of three engages in non-remunerated as well as economic activities for cash, 
in-kind, or non-monetary compensation. In fact, according to the 2007 and 2008 country reports 
of the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) on the state of child labor in Togo, about 32.7%2 of 
children aged between 5 to 14 years old were working in 2006.  
 
 





Some earlier works on the determinants of child labor have stressed the importance of 
education costs in explaining children’s unlawful participation to the labor force as these costs 
limit children’s school access (Canagarajah and Nielsen, 1999). Therefore, reductions in education 
costs and increased school access have been advocated as policy instruments to curb child labor. 
In this vein, in the 2010 report, the USDOL evoked the free primary education policy among the 
laws and regulations that would sustainably reduce the magnitude of the phenomenon. However, 
from a theoretical standpoint, it is not clear how such interventions affect child labor since school 
attendance and work are not mutually exclusive and thus children can adjust leisure as result of a 
change in the relative cost of education or in the household income (Ravallion & Wodon, 2000; 
Cigno & Rosati, 2005).  
Given the extent of children’s labor participation before the enactment of the universal 
primary education policy, it is crucial to evaluate the effect of such a large-scale pro-poor reform 
on restraining this practice. Two earlier works have examined the effect of the BRIGHT School 
Construction Program in Burkina Faso on children’s propensity to engage in household chores and 
economic activities. The Program included two main components. First, a school was built in each 
of the intervention villages. Second, the project provided direct incentives in the form of school 
kits, textbooks, and school meals for all students, and take-home rations for girls with a monthly 
attendance rate of 90% or higher to encourage school attendance. Analyzing the effect of the 
Program, Kazianga et al. (2013) found that the intervention has significantly reduced children’s 
household chores while De Hoop and Rosati (2013) showed that it rather increased children’s 
participation in economic activities and household chores. The discrepancy in these two studies is 
mainly due to differences in specifying their regression discontinuity models. Therefore, from an 




is known on the impact of larger scale pro-poor education policies on child labor. This paper 
purports to inform the literature on the causal effects of such a nationwide suppression of public 
primary school fees on child work by addressing the following question: what is the impact of the 
free public primary education policy in Togo on child labor?  
To address this question, this study uses data from the 2006 and 2010 waves of UNICEF’s 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). I compare, in a difference-in-differences framework, 
changes in child labor outcomes across intended beneficiaries of the policy and non-beneficiaries 
before and after the policy to identify the effect of the policy on child labor. I find that the free 
public primary education reform has led to 4-5 percentage point decline in overall child labor. An 
investigation of the different components of child labor reveals that the fall in overall child labor 
is mainly driven by the decline in children’s likelihood to perform household chores and out-of-
household activities. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple 
theoretical framework to apprehend a child’s schooling and work decisions. Section 2.3 succinctly 
describes and summarizes the data. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical methodology. Section 2.5 
presents the results while the last section concludes. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
This section relies on a standard utility maximization model to provide some insights into 
the relationship between a child’s schooling and work decisions. Assume a unitary household with 
parents maximizing a utility function defined over household consumption, children’s leisure, and 
children’s schooling decision. In general, if a child attends school, a fixed amount of their time has 




therefore not strictly convex as school attendance requires a fixed amount of time. The model relies 
on the following assumptions. The number of children in the household is assumed exogenous and 
set to unity and adult labor supply is fixed. Households do not have access to perfect capital 
markets. As such, human capital investment decisions are not separable from consumption 
decisions. Denoting by 𝐶 the household’s consumption, 𝑌 the household’s income, 𝐻 the hours of 
child work, 𝑤 the child’s hourly wage, 𝐿 the child’s leisure time, 𝜇 the monetary cost of education 
(tuition, book fees, etc.), 𝜏 the time spent attending and commuting to and from school, and 𝑆 a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the child is enrolled in school, the household’s utility maximization 
problem can be written as follows: 
max
𝐶,𝐿,𝑆
𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿, 𝑆)  𝑠. 𝑡 {
𝐶 = 𝑌 + 𝑤𝐻 − 𝜇𝑆
𝐻 + 𝐿 + 𝜏𝑆 = 1
𝑆 ∈ {0,1}
 
The fixed amount of time required by school attendance introduces non-convexity in the 
child’s time constraint. Expressing 𝐶 and 𝐿 as a function of 𝐻 and substituting these expressions 













 𝑈(𝑌 + 𝑤𝐻 − 𝜇, 1 − 𝐻 − 𝜏, 1)  𝑖𝑓 𝑆 = 1
 
What is the expected change in child labor after the enactment of the free public primary 
education policy? If the household does not send its children to school, children’s time is entirely 
available for leisure and work and the available exogenous income is 𝑌. There are four possible 
equilibrium solutions. If households are better off not sending their children to school, then the 
children will either work or neither work nor attend school. However, the latter is less plausible 




hours) and child work in family business. Conversely, if households prefer schooling their 
children, then the children can either attend school without working (lower consumption but more 
leisure) or work while attending school (higher consumption, but less leisure).  
The FPEP does not affect the budget constraint for families whose children are not enrolled 
neither before nor after the policy but changes the budget constraint for children enrolled before 
and after the reform in two ways. First, the reform reduces, ceteris paribus, their monetary cost of 
education. Second, through eventual supply side responses such as school openings, the policy 
may reduce the fixed amount of time devoted to school attendance due to school availability within 
a closer vicinity. The decline in the monetary cost of education would induce an upward shift in 
the budget constraint of households who send their children to school both before and after the 
intervention. If the reduction in school attendance time is negligible, the upward shift in the budget 
line for children who are enrolled in school before and after the intervention may cause leisure to 
increase (and child work to fall) or remain the same (and child labor to remain the same). However, 
if both changes (reduction in monetary cost of education and decline in school attendance time 
cost) occur subsequent to the reform, they could have opposite effects on the likelihood of child 
work for children who are enrolled in school before and after the policy. In fact, the reduction in 
their school attendance time will increase the time available for work and leisure. The resulting 
change in child work is therefore ambiguous. Children who were combining work and school 
before the reform may continue or stop working afterward. Children who were in school only may 
or may not start to work. 
I now consider children who were not in school and begin attending school as a result of 
the intervention. The rise in their monetary cost of education causes their family’s budget 




time for these children increases. The household may try to react to this downward shift in the 
budget line by increasing the children’s hours worked. However, there is now less time remaining 
for work and leisure. Hence, the effect of the FPEP on child labor is also undetermined for children 
not enrolled in school before the policy but enrolled afterward. Some of these children who were 
working before the reform may continue working or stop working. Others who were not working 
may even start to work. This simple representative agent utility maximization analysis suggests 
that the impact of the FPEP on child labor is undetermined. 
 
2.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.3.1. Data Description  
The dataset consists of the 2006 and 2010 waves of the UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Survey (MICS). These are nationally representative stratified and clustered multi-
households’ survey data which provide information on households and their members’ 
characteristics. The country is first divided in 12 strata obtained as follows: the 5 administrative 
regions plus the township of the capital Lomé are split into urban and rural areas. Then, a two-
stage cluster survey is performed in each stratum independently from one stratum to the other. In 
the first stage, a sample of enumeration areas or primary units or clusters is drawn with probability 
proportional to their size in terms of population. The second step consists in drawing, via a simple 
random poll without replacement, a constant number of households or secondary units from each 
primary unit. A total of 6600 and 6975 households have been surveyed respectively in 2006 and 
2010. This corresponds to a total of 10,018 children interviewed in 2006 and 9284 surveyed in 
2010. Once a household is selected, a questionnaire is administered to each of its members. The 




characteristics as well as information related to child labor. Regarding the latter, all 5- to 14-year-
old children in the selected households are interviewed on their school enrollment and attendance 
status, household chores, out-of-household non-remunerated activities, economic activities carried 
out for the household or a non-member of the household in the week prior to the interview. 
According to the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), a child is 
considered working if (a) s/he is 5–11 years old who, during the reference week, did at least one 
hour of economic activity and/or more than 21 hours of unpaid household services, or (b) s/he is 
12–14 years old who, during the reference week, did at least 14 hours of economic activity or more 
than 21 hours of unpaid household services. 
2.3.2. Summary Statistics 
 This subsection presents some key features of the data. Table 2.1 displays means for the 
whole sample as well as for the sample split by year and intention-to-treat status. Potential 
beneficiaries are primary school children and non-enrolled primary school-aged (6-11 years old) 
children at the time of the survey. The 2006 questionnaire did not record the type of school (public 
or private) attended by a child. Non-beneficiaries are children in secondary school or those not 
enrolled in school. The first two columns report means and standard deviations for the entire 
sample, while the remaining columns show these statistics for potential beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries before and after the free primary education policy. A number of sociodemographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics have been identified in the literature as potential determinants 
of child labor. The dataset enables to account for some of these variables namely the wealth index 
score used as proxy for a family’s wealth, the household size, the presence of a child’s genitrix in 




area of residency (urban or rural). The regression analyses model away over time observable 
differences between the two groups by including these characteristics as control variables. 






















Child labor 31.4 
 
31.5 34.0 17.5 
 
31.2 33.4 20.2 
Rem. out-of-HH child labor 3.1 
 
3.2 3.4 2.1 
 
3.0 3.3 1.4 
Non-rem. out-of-HH child labor 7.1 
 
6.6 7.1 3.5 
 
7.7 8.2 5.0 
Child's HH chores 7.2 
 
6.5 6.6 6.0 
 
8.1 7.8 9.6 
Child labor in a family business 20.1 
 
20.8 23.0 8.8 
 
19.3 21.8 6.9 
Girl 49.5 
 
50.1 50.6 46.9 
 
48.8 49.0 47.9 
Son/daughter of the HH head 75.1 
 
74.0 73.2 78.4 
 
76.3 76.9 73.3 
Wealth index score -0.134 
 
-0.171 -0.213 0.062 
 
-0.093 -0.171 0.299 
HH size 7.321 
 
7.383 7.415 7.204 
 
7.253 7.270 7.167 
Genitrix lives in the HH 74.2 
 
73.3 72.4 78.1 
 
75.2 76.2 70.6 
Mother's educ. lev. = None 59.3 
 
61.9 63.5 52.7 
 
56.5 58.6 45.8 
Mother's educ. lev. = Primary 28.2 
 
26.8 26.4 29.0 
 
29.8 29.5 31.3 
Mother's educ. lev. = Secondary + 12.5 
 
11.3 10.0 18.4 
 
13.7 11.9 22.9 
HH head's educ. lev. = None 43.4 
 
45.8 47.6 35.9 
 
40.8 42.5 32.1 
HH head's educ. lev. = Primary 29.2 
 
28.5 28.4 29.2 
 
29.8 30.6 25.8 
HH head's educ. lev. = Secondary + 27.4 
 
25.6 23.9 35.0 
 
29.4 26.9 42.1 
Urban area 31.0 
 
31.3 29.6 40.6 
 
30.7 27.7 46.1 
Number of observations 19302   10018 8568 1450   9284 7829 1455 
Notes: All figures, except the wealth index and the household size, are in percentage. HH refers to household. 
The table shows that 31.4% of children in the sample are engaged in child labor. 
Decomposing the child labor variable into its individual components reveals that 3% of children 
in the entire sample perform out-of-household remunerated works while about 7% perform unpaid 




in family business is the most important form of child labor in Togo. Child labor is mainly 
prevalent in family business including working in one’s family shop, farm, etc. or performing 
street vending for a family member. In fact, about 20% of children are engaged in this form of 
child labor. Therefore, any policy that is intended to curb child labor should aim at reducing 
substantially this form of child work. 
A stratification by treatment status shows that 34% of the potential beneficiaries were 
working in 2006 compared to 33.4% in 2010, which represents about 0.6 percentage point decline 
over time for the intendedly treated children. Meanwhile, child labor for non-beneficiaries 
increased by 2.7 percentage point. A simple difference-in-differences on unconditional means 
leads to a 3.3 percentage point decline in child labor for intendedly treated children. There are no 
drastic changes in the share of potential beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries engaged in 
remunerated out-of-household child work before and after the policy. Conversely, the proportion 
of potential beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries involved in household chores increase respectively 
by about 1.2 and 3.6 percentage point. A naïve difference-in-differences on unconditional means 
suggests that the FPEP led to a 2.4 percentage point reduction in potential beneficiaries’ propensity 
to perform household chores. As for child labor in family business, a stratification by treatment 
status reveals that about 23% of potential beneficiaries and 8.8% of non-beneficiaries were 
engaged in family business activities before the policy versus 21.8% of intended beneficiaries and 
6.9% of non-beneficiaries after the policy. 
 Some child and household level characteristics can positively or negatively influence child 
labor. Failing to account for them may bias the estimates of the effect of the intervention on child 
labor. The first household level characteristic identified as potential determinant of child labor is 




property ownership and household equipment (land and livestock not included) in order to assign 
weighting coefficients to assets of each household and obtain wealth scores for each household in 
the sample. The variables considered in the calculation of the wealth index are as follows: sources 
of water supply, type of sanitary facilities, wastewater disposal method, number of bedrooms in 
the house, nature of floor-wall-roof of the dwelling, type of energy source used for lighting and 
cooking food, and some possessed goods (electricity, television, telephone, car, refrigerator, 
cooking appliances, etc.). The average wealth index score for the whole sample is -0.133. In 
general, potential beneficiaries’ households are less wealthy. The second household level potential 
determinant of child labor considered in this study is the household size. There are 7.3 people on 
average in a household. This statistic is consistent across the two subpopulations before and after 
the academic year 2008-2009. A third characteristic susceptible to affect child labor is the presence 
of the child’s biological mother in the household. 74.2 % of children in the sample report that their 
genetrix lives in the household. In 2006, only 72.4% of potential beneficiaries were living with 
their biological mother compared to 78.1% for non-beneficiaries. In 2010, 76.2% of the potential 
beneficiaries were living with their genetrix while only 70.6% of non-beneficiaries had their 
mother present in the household.   Other variables that could influence child labor are the mother’s 
education level and the household head’s education level. Most kids (59.3%) reported that their 
mothers have no education level, 28.2% report that their mothers have a primary school level, and 
12.5% report a secondary or post-secondary education level. As for household heads, they seem 
more educated. In fact, 43.4% of kids reported that their household head has no education level, 
29.2% reported a primary education level, and 27.4% reported a secondary or post-secondary 
education level. Finally, the area of residency can also affect child labor. About 31% of kids of the 




versus 40.6% of non-beneficiaries were living in urban areas. Afterward, 27.7% of the intendedly 
treated children versus 46.1% of non-beneficiaries were living in urban areas. 
 
2.4. Empirical Strategy 
The policy was designed to improve access to primary school by eliminating primary 
education fees since they have been found to be an important constraint to school attainment3. To 
disentangle the effect of the reform on children’s participation to the labor force, one approach 
would be to compare children that are 5-14 years to older teenagers in a difference-in-differences 
setting. Unfortunately, the questionnaire does not collect information on this latter group of 
children. Another identification strategy would have been to construct a synthetic control for Togo 
using neighboring countries. However, only 2 years of pre-policy data are available, rendering 
impossible the implementation of this methodology.  
One way to overcome these constraints inherent to the data is to compare differences in 
child labor outcomes between treated (beneficiaries of the free primary education policy) and 
untreated children before and after the policy in a difference-in-differences approach to recover 
the treatment effect on the treated. However, the questionnaire did not provide any information on 
the type of school (public or private) attended by a child before the reform. Therefore, to overcome 
this other difficulty, I compare the intended beneficiaries of the free primary education policy to 
the non-beneficiaries before and after the intervention. Intended/potential beneficiaries are defined 
as children in primary school and non-enrolled primary school-aged (6-11 years old) children 
 
 




while non-beneficiaries are 5-year-old children not in school and secondary school students. Since 
there is no information on the type of school attended by a child before the enactment of the policy, 
this strategy would recover the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect rather than the treatment effect on 
the treated (TOT) per se. The TOT may be extrapolated if one assumes that the share of public 
primary school students in the sample is representative of the observed proportion in the 
population. The model can be written as follows: 
𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑡𝛼 + 𝑊ℎ𝑝𝑡𝛾 + 𝛿𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑡    (2.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑡 denotes the child labor outcome for child 𝑖 of household ℎ of prefecture 𝑝 in year 𝑡; 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑝 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if child 𝑖 of household ℎ of prefecture 𝑝 is in primary 
school and 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the post-policy year dummy; 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑡 represents child’s 
characteristics that can explain child labor; 𝑊ℎ𝑝𝑡 denotes the aforementioned household 
characteristics likely to affect child labor; 𝛿𝑝 and 𝜏𝑡 represent respectively prefecture and year 
unobserved heterogeneities; 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. Note that 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is not separately 
included in the model since it is perfectly collinear to the year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by prefecture to account for within-local area correlation in errors over time. Ideally, 
standard errors should be clustered at the enumeration area level. However, to preserve survey 
respondents’ anonymity and data confidentiality, the identifiers of the enumeration areas have been 
suppressed from the databases. 
 The first individual characteristic controlled for is the child’s sex. In fact, in Africa, girls 
are generally more involved in child work in the family context by performing household chores 
more than their boy siblings. Being a girl may therefore be associated with more child labor. A 




children of the household’s head may be less likely to engage in child labor compared to any other 
child in the household with less strong family ties. Children entrusted by their parents to other 
families (a common practice in the country known as “confiage”) may be more likely to engage in 
child labor than children living with their own parents. I therefore controlled for the fact that a 
child is the son or daughter of the household’s head. Another similar potential determinant of child 
labor is the presence of the child’s genitrix in the household. It may be the case that children living 
with their biological mothers are less prone to child labor than those whose genitrices do not dwell 
in the household. For example, children living under the custody of stepmothers may be more 
likely to engage in child labor than children living with their own mothers. Finally, the education 
level of a child’s mother can influence a child’s propensity to engage in child labor. More educated 
mothers may be less likely to allow this practice. 
As for household level determinants, several hypotheses have been considered in the 
literature as potential reasons for child labor. One of these hypotheses, probably the main one, 
posits that poverty is the main driver of child labor. In fact, a child from a wealthy family is less 
likely to engage in child labor. However, rich families may exploit other people or relatives’ 
children in their shops, businesses, farms, etc. Therefore, the effect of wealth on child labor may 
be ambiguous. The education level of the household’s head can also affect child labor propensity. 
In fact, more educated household heads may be less likely to endorse child labor. The size of the 
household can also explain children’s illegal participation to the labor force. Larger households 
may face more financial constraints and may therefore allow or require their children to perform 
remunerated works or work in family businesses to support the household’s income. Finally, I 
controlled for the type (urban/rural) of area of residency. However, it is not clear how the area of 




activities, it is nonetheless likely that children in urban areas can work in shops or shopping centers. 
The econometric model accounts for this by controlling not only for the type of residency but also 
for local area-specific unobserved determinants of child labor. 
 
2.5. Results 
 This section presents and discusses the results of the impact of the free primary education 
policy on child labor. Since child labor is a binary outcome, probit regressions were performed 
along with linear probability model (LPM) to check the robustness of the results. In the same vein, 
each specification is modelled respectively without and with control variables. Table 2.2 below 
presents the results of the regressions. Since the magnitude of coefficient estimates obtained from 
probit regressions is not directly interpretable, the probit regression estimates shown throughout 





Table 2.2. Effect on Overall Child Labor 
  LPM Probit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat*Post -0.0377* -0.0443** -0.0449** -0.0509** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Treat 0.1618*** 0.1459*** 0.1623*** 0.1488*** 
 









































































Observations 19096 19096 19096 19096 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include prefecture, 
and year fixed effects. The probit coefficient estimates reported are AME. Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
It is worth noting that the results obtained from the LPM are remarkably close to the AME 
derived from the probit regressions. The coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment 
dummy and the post-policy indicator is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This 




to about 4 to 5-percentage point decline in child labor for intendedly treated children. As mentioned 
earlier, this is the intention-to-treat effect of the FPEP rather than the treatment effect on the treated 
since the pre-treatment survey did not identify the type of school (public or private) attended by 
each child. Though slightly lower, these estimates are of the same order of magnitude as those 
estimated by Kazianga et al. (2013) in their evaluation of the impact of the BRIGHT program on 
students’ propensity to engage in some activities such as collecting firewood, house cleaning, 
fetching water, caring for siblings, tending animals, and help farming. They find that the BRIGHT 
program had a significant negative effect on child’s household chores in Burkina Faso. However, 
the relatively moderate magnitude of the effect suggests that there are other important drivers of 
child labor than non-affordable school fees.  
Hence, turning to the potential determinants accounted for, it appears that on average girls 
are a 3-percentage point more likely to be involved in child labor than boys. This confirms the 
previous hypothesis that girls may be more inclined to child labor because of their intensive 
involvement in household chores. Even though being a son or daughter of the household’s head 
has the expected negative coefficient, it does not seem to be a statistically significant determinant 
of overall child labor. However, as expected, the presence of a child’s biological mother in the 
household tends to have a significant deterrent effect on the child’s unlawful participation to the 
labor force. In fact, children living with their genitrices are 2.4 percentage point less likely to work 
than their counterparts whose mothers do not live in the household. The mother’s education level 
does not seem to be an important determinant of overall child labor as its coefficient is not 
statistically significant. However, as expected, the education level of the household head 
negatively and significantly influences child labor. In fact, an additional level of education of the 




Children in households whose heads are more educated are 2.3 percentage point less likely to 
engage in child labor. Besides, the family’s standard of living is a significant determinant of child 
labor. Children from wealthier families are less likely to be involved in child labor. A unit increase 
in the household wealth index score is associated with about 5-percentage point decline in a child’s 
propensity to work. The number of people living in the household seems to be a non-negligible 
determinant of child labor. A 1% increase in the size of the household leads to a 3-percentage point 
drop in child labor at the critical level of 10%. Finally, the type of area of residence also appears 
to significantly affect child labor. Children living in rural areas are about 4-percentage point more 
likely to engage in child labor than their counterparts in urban areas.  
To identify which type of child labor is driving these results, separate regressions were 
performed on each component of child labor, namely child’s household chores, child labor in 
family business, remunerated and non-remunerated outside-household child work. Table 2.3 





Table 2.3. Effect on Each Type of Child Labor 
  Child HH chores 
Child Labor in Family 
Business 
Rem. out-of-HH Child 
Labor 
Non-Rem. out-of-HH Child 
Labor 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treat*Post -0.0239* -0.0211* 0.0184 0.0116 0.0118 0.0107 -0.0138 -0.0117 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.031) (0.031) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
Treat 0.0082 0.0014 0.1299*** 0.1188*** 0.0128*** 0.0112*** 0.0418*** 0.0422*** 
 





























































































































Observations 19057 19057 19096 19096 19057 19057 19057 19057 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include prefecture, 
and year fixed effects. AMEs are reported. Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
 
The first two columns of Table 2.3 show that the free public primary education policy led 
to about 2 percentage point decline in child’s household chores at the 10% critical threshold. 
Columns (3) to (8) suggest that the policy has not significantly affected child labor in family 
business and out-of-household child labor. The policy has not affected children’s propensity to 
engage in street vending on the account of the family or work in family shop, farm, or perform 
remunerated out-of-household works, etc. Children may be requested to perform these activities 




source of income for financially constrained households rather than being inherent to unaffordable 
primary school fees, children may continue to work even after school fees have been eliminated. 
In sum, it appears that the decline in overall child labor is driven by the fall in children’s 
engagement in non-economic activities. In fact, the first two columns of Table B.1 in Appendix B 
indicates that the free public primary education reform caused about 4-percentage point decline in 
child’s non-economic activities. A stratification by gender reveals that the drop mainly occurred 
in the subpopulation of girls. The last two columns of Table B.1 echo this result. By allowing more 
girls, mainly involved in household chores, to enroll in school, the policy might have led to a 
reduction in the number of hours they spend on household chores. This is probably the case since 
these types of activities are performed on a daily basis, limiting the possibility of reallocating 
hours. However, this was not the case for economic activities. In fact, Table B.2 in Appendix B 
reveals that children’s involvement in economic activities, are they performed for the family or 
outside the household, has not been affected by the FPEP. It is possible that these activities are not 
performed daily and, as such, hours can be reallocated in a way that children can still engage in 
such activities while attending school. Since these activities are generally sources of income for 
poor households, children likely continued to perform them even after the policy. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This study finds that the free public primary education policy enacted by Togo in the school 
year 2008-2009 led to about 4-5 percentage point decline in child labor for intended beneficiaries 
of the program. The actual treatment effect on the treated may be lower or higher. A decomposition 
of the overall indicator of child labor into its individual components reveal that this result is mainly 




remunerated out-of-household activities. The reform has no significant effect on a child’s 
propensity to engage in economic activities (working in family business or performing out-of-
household remunerated activities). This result is not surprising given the context of child labor in 
the country. In fact, by increasing school access, the policy may lead to a reduction in the number 
of hours children, particularly girls, devote daily to household chores. However, by reallocating 
hours, they may keep working in family business and performing remunerated out-of-household 
activities as these activities generally represent a source of income for their families. Curbing these 
types of child labor as well may require coupling the free primary education reform with pro-poor 
welfare-enhancing programs. This finding suggests that large-scale nationwide programs that 
reduce the monetary costs of education are not sufficient to reduce certain types of child labor even 
though they effectively increase school attendance. Therefore, free primary education policies 
implemented with the aim to achieve an increased school attainment and a reduction in child labor 
may need to be coupled with other interventions that can effectively reduce children’s participation 









Over the recent decades, several countries around the world have introduced policies to 
limit cash use and incentivize the use of electronic means of payments in order to combat money 
laundering, terrorism financing, and tax evasion. Despite the emergence of new risks for tax 
compliance associated with technological change, the use of cash remains central in money 
laundering (Europol, 2015). Cashless payments can influence VAT evasion by limiting the ability 
of small businesses and the self-employed to maintain tax-evading, parallel cash activities for 
which cash revenue is a necessary requirement (Clearly Morse et al., 2009). From 2005 to date, an 
increasing number of European countries have introduced upper limits to cash payments. In total, 
17 out of 28 EU member countries have implemented some sort of cash restriction as of September 
2017. These cash restrictions range from EUR 500 in Greece to EUR 15,000 in Poland. In Spain, 
the government is contemplating to further reduce the current limit of cash payments (EUR 2,500 
enacted in 2012 to EUR 1,000). The institutional response by the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) to cash limiting legislations has been cautious. Recital 19 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of the euro states that ‘limitations on 
payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons, are not 
incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful 
means for the settlement of monetary debts are available’, a position maintained throughout the 
circulation of the euro as documented in ECB publications (e.g. ECB Opinions CON/2002/24, 




among others). However, concerns have been raised that limitations on cash payments may 
constitute a breach of the legal tender status of cash. This has prompted recommendations for cash 
limit levels that are proportionate to the targeted money-laundering schemes.4  
In some countries where these express cash restrictions are absent, the authorities require 
special reporting of cash payments. A marked example is the Form 8300 system in the United 
States which requires that any person engaged in a trade or business who receives more than 
$10,000 in one transaction or several related transactions must file a cash payment report to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This system is supposedly used by the government to track tax 
evaders and individuals profiting from criminal activities. 
Given all these cases of explicit or tacit cash restriction policies, it is of paramount 
importance to evaluate whether the belief that limiting cash transactions reduces tax evasion 
through increased use of electronic means of payments holds empirically. Has the proliferation in 
credit and debit card usage or the use of other electronic forms of payments (plastic money, 
hereafter) contributed to increase compliance with the consumption tax in the European Union 
(EU)? The link between VAT compliance and plastic money is justified by the fact that plastic 
money is the primary substitute to cash, and because plastic money transactions are traceable by 
tax authorities, they are less prone to tax evasion than cash transactions. The question deserves 
attention since the shift in norms and preferences regarding forms of payments presents an 
excellent opportunity for tax administrations to close the consumption tax compliance gap either 
 
 
4 The Consultation Strategy of the European Commission on February 2, 2016 (European Commission, 2016) and the Opinion of the European 
Central Bank of 30 December 2019 (CON/2019/46) on limitations to cash payments can be accessed here: 





directly by bringing previously unreported transactions into the tax net or by using newly generated 
third-party information (Kleven et al., 2011). Slemrod et al. (2017) investigate the effect of 
reporting requirements on sole proprietorship income obtained from electronic transactions such 
as credit card payments using confidential IRS tax return data. They estimate a small but robust 
increase in tax filing and reported tax receipts for a subset of taxpayers more prone to behavioral 
response. Between 2000 and 2016, the average share of transactions cleared via plastic money in 
the 26 EU countries increased from EUR 34.6 billion to EUR 111.9 billion. In terms of nominal 
GDP, this represents a growth from 9.3% to 19.5%. And, as noted by Auer et al. (2020), the 
COVID-19 lockdowns and rise in beliefs regarding viral transmission via cash may only 
compound the increasing trend toward plastic money use.5 At the same time, tax administrations 
in the EU, indeed around the world, have implemented a number of innovations aiming to capture 
“hard-to-tax” tax bases, which would appear have improved overall tax compliance but which 
have also confounded the potential impact of the shift in consumer preference in favor of plastic 
money. Therefore, up to now it remains unclear how important the role of plastic money has been 
in narrowing the observed tax compliance gap in the EU. Obtaining an answer to this question 
would be helpful also to other countries, especially developing countries, struggling with tax 
enforcement issues. 
 The seminal paper on the importance of third-party information in the context of the VAT 
by Pomeranz (2015) establishes the first-order deterrence effect of the paper trail generated by 
transactions between firms in Chile. An empirical literature has emerged with works closer to the 
 
 
5 Albeit not relevant to the tax compliance focus of this paper, it is important to note that the documented rise in the digital payments could have 




research question of this study. First, Madzharova (2020) explores the impact of cash and card 
transactions on VAT collection efficiency in the European Union (EU) member states from 2000 
to 2010 and finds a statistically significant positive effect of card payments on tax revenue 
performance. Second, Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2020) analyze the effect of card 
payments on VAT revenue in 19 European Monetary Union (EMU) countries using panel quarterly 
information from 2003 to 2016. These authors find that a larger share of card payments in private 
consumption expenditure increases VAT revenue in the EU as a whole. Finally, Immordino and 
Russo (2018a) find some evidence of a positive effect of credit and debit card payments on VAT 
compliance in the EU while also showing that ATM cash withdrawals increase VAT evasion. 
The first contribution of this study relative to Madzharova (2020) and Hondroyiannis and 
Papaoikonomou (2020) lies in the use of a less broad measure of VAT gap that is much more 
closely related to tax compliance. First, the dependent variable or observed outcome in our analysis 
is the VAT compliance gap as opposed to VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR) and VAT revenue used in 
pre-existing literature. This is computed as the difference between expected and realized tax 
revenues and may be interpreted as foregone tax revenues net of parameters that determine 
expected tax revenues such as tax rates.6 The VAT compliance gap is less susceptible to the 
inclusion or exclusion of observable factors that can be accounted for (manipulation bias) as well 
as unobservable confounding variation from other factors that influence revenue collection, such 
as changes in tax administration quality or enforcement capacity, which we may fail to capture 
fully (omitted variable bias), or partly (measurement error). The fact that the outcome in this study 
 
 
6 The estimated VAT gaps are defined as the difference between expected VAT revenues according to the law and actual VAT collections. This 
includes “foregone VAT revenue from to tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. Moreover, the tax gap also incorporates revenues losses from 




is pre-determined by the reports of the Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Unions (DG 
TAXUD) safeguards against the arbitrary choice of explanatory variables that would introduce 
manipulation bias into our results. Furthermore, even observable factors such as exemptions and 
zero-rates cannot be easily accounted for when using aggregate (national) level data. In the prior 
literature, these correlations had been relegated to the error term, potentially leading to omitted 
variable bias issues, whereas in this study, they are captured by the outcome variable by 
definition. Even though Immordino and Russo (2018a) employ appropriate measures of VAT 
compliance gap, they estimate the effect of a single mean of payment at a time without accounting 
for variations in the other means of transactions. Furthermore, they do not control for public 
authorities’ efforts toward reducing the gap, which may overstate their estimates. These potential 
causes of omitted variable bias could lead to overestimate plastic money’s role in reducing VAT 
gaps. Finally, with the availability of more recent data, this paper extends the examination of 
plastic money’s impact in the literature to a period during which it became much more prominent 
throughout the continent. From 2012 to 2016, the years for which this paper provides novel 
estimates, debit and credit card use increased by 43% (25.5% as a fraction of GDP). 
 This study exploits variation in time and space of credit and debit card usage across 26 EU 
member states from 2000-2016 using panel data and instrumental variable techniques to identify 
the effect of plastic money on VAT compliance. It finds that an increase in the share of plastic 
money used for consumption expenditures is associated with a significant decrease in the VAT 
gap. The policy implications of these results are twofold. First, they highlight the role that 
technological supply-side innovations such as the use of plastic money can play in assisting the 




demonstrate the limitations of some forms of third-party reporting in improving consumption tax 
compliance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section succinctly reviews 
the broad literature on the determinants of VAT compliance as well as the specific literature on 
the effect of plastic money use on VAT compliance. Section 3.3 describes the data, provides some 
key summary statistics, and delineates the empirical strategy. Section 3.4 presents and discusses 
the results while the last section concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
Several studies have empirically examined the economic, social, and institutional 
determinants of VAT compliance. While some studies analyzed the determinants of VAT 
revenues, rather than measures of VAT non-compliance per se, one needs to be cautious in 
comparing the results of these two groups of studies since VAT revenues and the VAT Revenue 
Ratio (VRR) reflect not only the effect of non-compliance but also the impact of policy choices on 
tax structure such as exemptions, reduced rates on certain transactions, etc. This section first 
reviews studies on the determinants of VAT compliance gap to circumscribe the universe of 
potential control variables and then focus on papers that investigate the effect of card payments on 
VAT revenue or measures of VAT efficiency. 
In a pioneering study, Agha and Haughton (1996) constructed an index of VAT compliance 
for a cross-section of 17 OECD countries in 1987 and regressed it on characteristics of the 
countries and their VAT rates. The index was set as the ratio of actual VAT to potential VAT, 




that compliance is considerably lower with multiple VAT rates. The study also suggests that VAT 
compliance increases the longer VAT has been introduced. 
Studying the factors that determine VAT fraud in Italy from 1982 to 2001, Otranto, Pisano and 
Polidoro (2003) find that VAT evasion is positively affected by variables such as the GDP, the 
share of the fiscal burden, and the ratio of gross profits over value added. However, it is negatively 
associated with the number of taxpayers audited in the previous year by public authorities. Christie 
and Holzner (2006) examine data for 29 European countries over the period 2000-2003. Their 
analysis reveals that higher VAT rates reduce VAT compliance whereas greater judicial and legal 
effectiveness improve compliance. 
Another seminal study devised to quantify and analyze the VAT gap was the one commissioned 
by the DG TAXUD of the European Commission and executed by Reckon (2009). Investigating 
the relationship between the estimated VAT compliance gap and some economic and institutional 
variables, the report reveals that VAT gaps were significantly higher in countries with higher 
perceived levels of corruption. However, the study does not find robust statistical evidence of an 
association between the compliance gap and economic variables such as the sectoral composition 
of the economy, the GDP per capita, the level of taxation (VAT standard rate and theoretical VAT 
liability as a proportion of GDP), etc. One methodological issue with the Reckon report is that it 
relies on a random effect estimator which assumes that unobserved country-specific differences 
that determine taxpayer compliance are random, and thus uncorrelated to the explanatory variables 
of interest. This approach may suffer from omitted variable bias and therefore unlikely to produce 
reliable estimates of the determinants of the VAT gap. Aware of this possible limitation, the recent 
study commissioned by the DG TAXUD and conducted by the Center for Social and Economic 




the VAT compliance in European countries. The final report released in 2018 suggests that the 
productive structure of the economy affects the VAT compliance gap with the biggest effect due 
to the retail sector. This means that the larger the share of the retail sale sector in the economy, the 
larger is the gap. It also reveals a positive correlation between unemployment as a proxy of 
liquidity constraints and the level of the compliance gap. However, the report does not find a 
consistent effect of the scale of the tax administration on the VAT compliance gap. From the 
regressions which include subsets of the explanatory variables, the authors find that higher 
administration costs lead to lower compliance gaps. However, once all the explanatory variables 
are introduced in the regression analysis, the study finds a positive, U-shaped association between 
the scale of the tax administration and the compliance gap, suggesting that higher administration 
expenditures hinder tax compliance up to a certain threshold and then become productive. In the 
same vein, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) examine the determinants of tax morale in a 
multilevel analysis in the EU. They find that tax morale is a function of individual and contextual 
level variables. They show that tax morale in European countries varies systematically, on the one 
hand, with socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education level, and religion), personal 
financial experiences (income levels and self-employment), political attitudes (satisfaction with 
democracy, trust in politicians, and measures to reduce differences in income), and on the other 
hand, with regional GDP and tax arrangements. Due to the close correlation between tax morale 
and VAT compliance, this paper includes predictors of tax morale in its empirical analysis given 
that tax morale is not available in annual frequency for all the countries in the study sample. 
Turning to studies that examined the effect of card payments on VAT revenue or VAT 
efficiency measures, a few works closely related to this paper are those by Madzharova (2020), 




Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2017) analyze the effect of card payments on VAT revenue 
after Greek authorities imposed restrictions on cash withdrawals in July 2015. They find that a 1 
percentage point increase in the share of credit card payments in private consumption results in 
approximately 1% increase in VAT revenue. Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2020) examine 
the same relationship using quarterly panel data for the 19 Euro area economies from 2003-2016 
to find that an increasing share of credit card payments in private consumption expenditure 
improves VAT revenue in the EU. Moreover, they show that gains from increased credit card use 
are decreasing in baseline card use and revenue efficiency levels while increasing in the share of 
self-employed individuals in the labor force with the largest gains reported for Greece and Italy.  
Madzharova (2020) investigates the impact of cash and card transactions on VAT collection 
efficiency in the European Union member states from 2000 to 2010. She finds statistically 
significant improvements on tax revenue performance from increased use of card payments and 
that cash usage has a consistent negative effect on VAT efficiency. A potential concern with this 
study is the use of observed VAT revenue or (VRR) as the measure of tax revenue efficiency 
without controlling in their estimations for contemporaneous tax policy changes of importance 
such as the enforcement capacity of the tax administration. This situation can lead to omitted 
variable bias in the estimates reported in these papers. In fact, tax fraud and tax evasion account 
for only a fraction of the entire VAT gap. The remaining portion of the total gap is due to tax 
structure policy decisions - the legal gap - which varies widely across space and time. In a nutshell, 
by using improper measures of tax compliance efficiency, these studies are limited in tracing out 
the effect of plastic money on tax compliance since the policy gap varies widely within a country 
and across countries. In this respect, Madzharova (2020) acknowledges that, ideally, one should 




gaps computed through the joint effort of a dozen tax administrations and research institutions in 
for a study commissioned by the DG TAXUD in 2015 on the VAT gap in the EU member states. 
This alternative outcome is also preferred by Immordino and Russo (2018a), the most closely 
related study to this paper. Even though an appropriate measure of VAT compliance gap is used 
in it, evaluating the effect of one mean of payments (either cash or card) at a time while abstracting 
from the other transaction method can pose the problem of omitting a relevant regressor if the two 
types of transactions are strongly correlated. In fact, economic agents do not perform only card 
payments or only cash transactions. The majority of agents does both and both are present at the 
same time in the economy and are related (complements or substitutes). Hence, the effect of the 
use of one means of payments on the compliance gap should be conditional on the use of the other 
one. Moreover, the study does not account for ex ante efforts made by public authorities to reduce 
the VAT gap, which can cast doubt on its estimates. For example, stronger tax administrations 
may advocate in favor of severe cash restriction policies in order to curb the gap. This can lead, 
once again, to omitted variable bias issue in their analysis. Finally, this paper also provides an 
update of Immordino and Russo (2018a) by extending the panel by four more years during which 
plastic money use increased markedly. 
 
3.3. Data and Empirical Analysis 
This section first describes the data utilized in this study and presents some key summary 
statistics on VAT compliance gap and plastic money use in the EU. Then, it discusses the 






The data utilized in this study stem from several sources and cover the period 2000 to 2016. 
The empirical exercise focuses on the effect of proliferation in credit and debit card use on 
consumption tax compliance, namely VAT compliance. The measures of VAT gap utilized are the 
VAT gap in EUR, the VAT gap as share of GDP, and the VAT gap as share of Value-Added Total 
Tax Liability (VTTL), which proceed from the 2013 and 2018 final reports on the VAT gap in the 
European Union member states (TAXUD, 2018). These data are available for all the 26 countries 
from 2000 to 2016. The first key explanatory variable is the value of card transactions by all cards 
issued in the reporting country as a share of GDP. Card payments cover the period 2000-2016 for 
all the countries but Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and Slovakia for which they are available from 2001, 
and Spain where they stem from 2002. The second main regressor is the ratio of cash withdrawals 
to GDP. The GDP data proceed from Eurostat database, while card payments and cash transactions 
are drawn from the European Central Bank (ECB) data warehouse. The analysis uses ATM cash 
withdrawals (pertaining to cards issued in the reporting country) which have fewer missing 
observations to approximate cash transactions.7 In lieu of cash transactions, the analysis uses in 
some specifications the relative size of the shadow economy in the GDP as computed by Medina 
and Schneider (2018). The ECB also provides information on the number of ATM per million 
inhabitants. 
Expected efforts made by the tax administration to close the VAT gap ex ante can also have a 
deterrent effect on private agents’ tax compliance behavior. These efforts can be driven by the 
 
 
7 A more precise proxy for cash transactions would be the sum of the value of Automatic Teller Machine (ATM), Over-The-Counter (OTC), and 
Point-Of-Sale (POS) cash withdrawals. However, there are a lot of missing values on these variables for each country at different points in time. 




scale of the tax administration (measured as the ratio of total administrative costs as a percent of 
GDP), the share of information and technology expenditures in total administrative costs, as well 
as the level of public indebtedness measured by the ratio of public deficit to GDP. The study 
therefore accounts for these 3 variables to proxy the effect of the tax administration on voluntary 
tax compliance, controlling for them in a lagged form to reflect expectations. The data on the scale 
of the tax administration and IT expenditures stem from the OECD data bank while the ratio of 
public deficit to GDP comes from Eurostat. 
One factor supposed to shape tax morale, and thus potentially tax compliance, is age structure. In 
fact, the literature on tax morale finds that older people exhibit higher tax morale, which is 
commonly explained as being more aware of the benefits of adopting a prosocial behavior 
(Koumpias et al., 2020). The variable used to proxy tax morale is the share of people over 50 years 
old in the population obtained from Eurostat database. In addition, the less effective use of public 
resources by the government, the perception of private economic agents about the poor 
performance of public authorities, and liquidity constraints can create incentives to free ride and 
avoid tax payment (Godin and Hindriks, 2015). To account for the quality of government, this 
paper utilizes the World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator. Besides, it controlled for the 
unemployment rate obtained from Eurostat to proxy for liquidity constraints and the business 
cycle. The analysis also accounted for over time cross-country differences in payment habits that 
depend on the level of economic development by controlling for the GDP per capita. Tax evasion 
can also depend on the productive structure of the economy in the sense that some sectors (like 
wholesale and retail trade) may be more prone to tax evasion than others (such as real estate). 
Therefore, the study controlled for the percentage share of the following sectors in the gross value-




(probably the key sector subject to tax evasion), as well as real estate, construction, industry, 
information and communication, and art and entertainment. Sectors that are exempted from VAT, 
namely health, education, or financial services, are excluded. These series as well as those on GDP 
per capita and population size are obtained from the Eurostat data bank. Finally, private agents’ 
tax compliance behavior can be affected by prevailing VAT rates. However, VAT rates do not 
change very often. Hence, their impact on the compliance gap would be subsumed in country-
specific heterogeneities. Following the 2018 TAXUD report, the paper controlled instead for the 
dispersion of tax rates (within a country), which provide incentives and opportunities for evasion, 
and the information for which was generously provided by the authors of the 2018 TAXUD report. 
Some of the control variables also record missing values for some countries in specific years. 
Given all that, the dataset is an unbalanced panel covering the period 2000-2016. Table C.1 in 
Appendix C provides summary statistics and data sources for all variables employed. 
3.3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 3.1 below is a binned scatterplot of the VAT gaps and plastic money use between 
2000 and 2016. For each country studied, it plots the estimated average VAT gap in each plastic 
money usage bin (20 bins specified).8 It is used to succinctly illustrate the relationship between 
VAT gap levels and plastic money use. Despite substantial heterogeneity, it provides first evidence 
of a negative correlation between VAT gaps and plastic money use. This association may also be 
the consequence of third factors that jointly impacted VAT gaps and plastic money use. 
Nevertheless, it highlights the fact that the proliferation of plastic money coincided with a 
 
 
8 For all countries but Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Spain, data on plastic money use are available from 2000. For Bulgaria, 




reduction in VAT gaps. Furthermore, to highlight the differential relationship between plastic 
money use and VAT gaps across different blocs of EU countries, the sample was split by whether 
or not a country is classified as a Central and Eastern European (CEE) country according to the 
OECD. This illustrates that this inverse relationship of interest is relatively more pronounced for 
CEE countries which may be attributed to lower baseline plastic money usage levels in these 
countries. 
Figure 3.1. VAT Gaps and Plastic Money Use in CEE and Non-CEE Countries 
 
Notes: Binned scatterplot of VAT gaps and plastic money use by Central Eastern European (CEE) and non-CEE EU member states 
3.3.3. Empirical Strategy 
To identify the effect of plastic money on VAT compliance, this study exploits 
spatiotemporal variations in plastic money usage over time across different EU member states in 
a fixed effect (FE) panel regression framework. An advantage of the FE estimation technique is 
that it allows country-specific time-invariant unobservables to be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The econometric model can be specified as follows: 




where 𝑖 denotes the country, and 𝑡 represents the year; 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the outcome (VAT gap, VAT 
gap as share of GDP, and VAT gap as share of VTTL); 𝑊1𝑖𝑡 is the main explanatory variable, 
defined as the logged total value of residents’ card payments as share of GDP; 𝑊2𝑖𝑡 represents the 
logged ATM cash withdrawals as share of GDP; 𝑿𝑖𝑡 denotes the set of control variables (incentives 
created by the tax administration, government effectiveness, productive structure of the economy, 
tax morale, GDP per capita) discussed above in subsection 3.3.1. These regressors were included 
as they have been pre-identified as determinants of VAT gaps in the literature (TAXUD, 2018). 
Some control variables, namely cash withdrawals as share of GDP, population and GDP per capita, 
enter the model in their logarithm form. The term 𝜇𝑖 captures time-invariant country-specific 
heterogeneities that affect tax compliance while 𝜏𝑡 accounts for year-specific effects such as 
macroeconomic factors that affect indifferently tax compliance in the European economies under 
study; 𝜖𝑖𝑡 represents the idiosyncratic disturbance while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 identify respectively the effect 
of plastic money use and cash transactions on tax compliance. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level to account for serial within-country correlation in the data. 
 A potential concern with the model specified by equation (3.1) is that the choice to use a 
specific means of transactions may be endogenous to tax evasion. Immordino and Russo (2018b) 
propose a bargaining model where buyers may reach an agreement with sellers to engage in 
collaborative tax evasion for a reduced transaction price. To overcome this potential threat to 
identification, the analysis resorts to an instrumental variable (IV) approach. For the IV technique 
to be valid, a number of tests needs to be performed. First, one needs to test if the instruments are 
exogenous, i.e., if they are uncorrelated with the error process in the structural equation. In the 
present context, this implies that each of these instruments must affect plastic money use without 




through its effect on the payment method. A rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hansen J 
statistic of overidentification test casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. Second, one needs 
to check if the instruments are relevant, i.e., if they are sufficiently strong in predicting the 
endogenous regressors. This is obtained through the test of weak identification which compares a 
Wald-type F statistic to critical values tabulated by Stock-Yogo (2005). A rejection of the null 
hypothesis suggests that the model is not weakly identified. Since the specification allows for 
heteroskedastic errors, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is no longer valid, and one needs to use 
instead the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic. This test is important because in the presence 
of weak instruments, the loss of precision is severe, and IV estimates may even perform poorly 
than those obtained via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Hence, third, it is important to assess 
whether the potentially endogenous regressors should be treated as exogenous given the 
instruments. Under homoskedasticity, this is equivalent to the Hausman test of IV estimates versus 
OLS estimates. 
Following Immordino and Russo (2018a), card and cash payments were instrumented by 
the number of ATM per million inhabitants and the number of fixed broadband internet 
connections per inhabitant. In addition, the number of bank branches per 100 km2 (bank branch 
density) was employed as a third instrumental variable.  The choice of the number of ATMs as 
instrument is justified by the fact that the availability of ATM terminals can stimulate cash 
withdrawals. It is likely that less direct card transactions are recorded where there are more ATMs 
available since it is easier to get cash. Besides, it has been documented that ATM development is 
mainly due to technological advances that curb their installation and management costs, ruling out 
the possibility that the diffusion of ATMs is a response to tax evasion. Finally, one cannot conceive 




withdrawals (Humphrey et al., 2006). Therefore, the number of ATMs per million inhabitants is 
expected to be negatively and positively associated with card payments and ATM cash 
withdrawals, respectively, as they reflect individual demand for cash. Bank branch density was 
used to decompose the differential supply- and demand-side effects of access to banking services. 
Closely related in nature as another proxy of banking services availability, it is reasonable to 
assume bank branch density to be also positively associated with demand for cash and, 
subsequently, ATM cash withdrawals. The paper posits that bank branch density is additionally 
influenced by supply-side effects in the form of banking industry reorganization with the advent 
of e-banking, not VAT gaps. Thus, bank branch density is expected to be also positively associated 
with the share of card payments as a percent of the GDP.  Similar arguments hold for broadband 
internet connections. The use of broadband internet connections as an instrument is motivated by 
the fact it facilitates electronic transactions which require cashless payments. Therefore, more 
broadband connections would induce more transactions cleared via plastic money and less demand 
of cash for transactions. Consequently, a positive and negative relationship between plastic money 
usage and cash usage, respectively, is expected. As in the case of ATM development, broadband 
connections mainly hinge on the availability of the infrastructure in a given country, which, in 
turn, is likely not correlated with VAT evasion. Further, the exclusion restriction requires that any 
effect of variations in broadband internet connections affects VAT gaps solely via plastic money 
use. This is a tenable assumption since more broadband internet connections directly affect VAT 
gap by requiring cashless transactions whereas any effect on tax enforcement is fully captured in 
the calculation of the VAT gap, by design (Immordino and Russo, 2018a). As stated earlier, the 
main difference with Immordino and Russo (2018a) lies in the fact that these authors considered 




logged card payments and cash withdrawals as share of GDP are regressed on the set of instruments 
and control variables which include country and year unobserved heterogeneities. In order to test 
for overidentification, the analysis includes the interaction term of the number of ATMs per million 
inhabitants with the broadband internet connection and the interaction term of the number of 
ATMs per million inhabitants with bank branches. The first interaction term is justified by the fact 
that card payments are likely determined by the combination of the two means, whereas the second 
interaction term accounts for non-commercial ATM attached to a bank branch as opposed to 
standalone ATMs that are more susceptible to variations in demand for cash. This intuition is 
confirmed by the results of the first stage IV regression reported in Table C.3 in Appendix C. 
 
3.4. Results 
The results indicate a strong correlation between card payments and cash withdrawals. 
Therefore, as stressed earlier, the concern regarding overestimation of the impact of plastic money 
use due to omitted variable bias in prior studies is valid. The analysis then examines a regression 
model that accounts for both means of transactions as well as tax enforcement endeavors of public 
administrations. Table 3.1 displays the results of the cross-country fixed effect panel regressions. 
Three different variations of the outcome are considered. In columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6), 
the dependent variables are respectively the logarithm of the VAT gap, the VAT gap as percent of 
GDP and the VAT gap as percent of VTTL. The preferred outcome variable is the VAT gap as 
share of GDP since one can similarly normalize the key independent variable by GDP. Columns 
(2), (4), and (6) report the estimates of regressions that include the size of the shadow economy 




an indicator for CEE countries and its interaction with card payment transactions are included as 
additional explanatory variables. 
Table 3.1. FE Panel Regression of VAT Gap on Plastic Money Use 
  Log (VAT gap) VAT gap as % of GDP VAT gap as % of VTTL 
Log(Card payments as % of GDP) 0.0482 -0.0306 0.1030 0.0736 0.5584 -0.1474 
 
(0.137) (0.087) (0.155) (0.150) (1.566) (1.631) 


























Share of whole and retail sale in VA (%) -0.0148 -0.0316 -0.0562 -0.0567 0.0526 -0.0503 
 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.056) (0.049) (0.391) (0.332) 
Share of real estate in VA (%) -0.0614 -0.0478 -0.0195 -0.0128 -0.1995 -0.1785 
 
(0.055) (0.048) (0.056) (0.060) (0.510) (0.554) 
Share of arts in VA (%) -0.0754 -0.0394 0.0347 0.0520 0.0372 0.1799 
 
(0.064) (0.050) (0.055) (0.054) (0.530) (0.494) 
Dispersion of tax rates -0.7873 -1.9653 2.5325 1.6008 26.1645 14.9402 
 
(1.814) (2.005) (1.940) (2.223) (18.965) (22.419) 
Unemployment rate 0.0241 0.0423** 0.0554** 0.0512* 0.4771** 0.4600** 
 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.206) (0.211) 
Age structure 0.0750 0.0486 0.1367** 0.0949* 1.0273* 0.6665 
 
(0.051) (0.044) (0.059) (0.054) (0.561) (0.492) 
Deficit to GDP ratio -0.0297 -0.0220 -0.0323* -0.0292 -0.3296* -0.2784 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.176) (0.174) 







Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 412 411 412 411 412 411 
R-squared 0.317 0.363 0.314 0.264 0.286 0.227 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, share of telecommunications 




The OLS estimates reported in Table 3.1 suggest that plastic money use does not 
significantly affect VAT compliance in the EU. This result is consistent with the OLS results of 
Immordino and Russo (2018a) who find no impact of card payments on VAT collection efficiency. 
However, this result is not in line with Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2020) who find that 
the share of card payments in private consumption expenditure improves VAT tax compliance in 
the 19 Euro area economies. Next, it appears that the unemployment rate has a large, positive, and 
very precise association with all measures of VAT gap. Again, this is not surprising given that the 
unemployment rate is directly related to the size of the shadow economy which has been typically 
found to increase tax evasion and thus the tax compliance gap. Lastly, the naive OLS estimates 
suggest a positive and weakly statistically significant relationship between the GDP per capita and 
the level VAT gap. However, this is not confirmed when using the VAT gap as share of VTTL. It 
is not immediately obvious why; a potential explanation might be a common stochastic trend 
shared by these two macroeconomic aggregate time series.  
To tackle the aforementioned potential endogeneity issue, the study now resorts to an IV 
approach using the prevalence of ATM, broadband internet connections, and geographical density 
of bank branches in a country as well as the interaction term of the number of ATMs per million 
inhabitants with each of the other instruments. Table C.3 in Appendix C reports the estimates of 
the first stage regressions.  
The population density of ATMs and, to a lesser extent, the geographical density of bank branches 
are also predictive of card use which could indicate banking services availability. As expected, 
broadband internet connections, as an indicator of a digital society, are positively linked to plastic 
money usage and negatively linked to cash withdrawals. However, as ATM density (broadband 




becomes less pronounced. Conversely, the negative effect of broadband internet connections on 
cash withdrawals is weaker when more ATMs per million inhabitants are available. Not 
surprisingly, ATM and bank branch density are positively related to cash withdrawals. The 
relatively stronger association between ATM density and cash withdrawals confirms our 
conjecture that ATM density reflects demand for cash whereas bank branch density may be also 
driven by supply-side changes in the banking industry. As more bank branches (ATMs) are 
introduced though, the effect of ATM (bank branch) density on cash withdrawals becomes 
negative, and vice versa. Still, the magnitude of the estimated negative effect of the interaction 
term is relatively smaller than the positive effects estimated for each of their factors. Thus, this 
small effect could reflect market saturation and the adverse influence of increasing banking 
services on cash withdrawals that does not reverse the main effects. Finally, a null effect of branch 
density (ATM density) on card use is recovered when ATM density (branch density) rises. 
The Hansen J test of overidentification fails to reject the null hypothesis of overidentification of 
the models in all the three columns at the conventional critical level of 5%. This suggests that the 
instruments are valid. Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistics compared to the 
Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values suggest that the instruments are relatively 
strong. Finally, the endogeneity tests conditional on the instruments reject in all the cases the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of plastic money use and cash transactions, and therefore IV estimates 






Table 3.2. Second Stage FE IV Regression of VAT Gap 
 
Log (VAT gap) VAT gap as % of GDP 
VAT gap as % of 
VTTL 
Log (Card payments as % of GDP) -0.3387 -0.5107* -7.6172** 
 
(0.274) (0.290) (3.362) 
Log (Cash withdrawals as % of GDP) 0.4259** 0.5951*** 4.3074** 
 
(0.168) (0.192) (1.840) 
Share of whole and retail sale in VA (%) -0.0195 -0.0502 0.1004 
 
(0.026) (0.036) (0.279) 
Share of real estate in VA (%) -0.0956** -0.0685* -0.7450** 
 
(0.043) (0.039) (0.363) 
Share of arts in VA (%) -0.0589 0.0525 0.2820 
 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.610) 
Dispersion rate -0.3296 4.1564*** 38.0624*** 
 
(1.392) (1.387) (14.426) 
Unemployment rate 0.0123 0.0350** 0.2963* 
 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.160) 
Age structure 0.0347 0.0743 0.3829 
 
(0.036) (0.046) (0.406) 
Deficit to GDP ratio -0.0282** -0.0298** -0.2804* 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.144) 







R-squared 0.264 0.254 0.176 
Observations 395 395 395 
Number of countries 25 25 25 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 15.77 24.02 15.77 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 15.21 24.10 15.21 
Hansen J 1.552 1.510 5.584 
Prob > J 0.670 0.680 0.134 
C test of endogeneity 11.22 22.70 24.86 
Prob > C 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, share of telecommunications 
in VA, and Log(Population). All regressions include country, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.  




Conversely to the naïve OLS estimates, it appears that card payments are somewhat 
contributive in reducing tax evasion. In fact, column (3) reports a strong negative effect of plastic 
money use on VAT evasion at the 5% significance level while column (2) shows a less strong 
effect (significant at the 10% level) of card payments on tax compliance. Specifically, the analysis 
finds that a 1% increase in card payments as share of GDP translates to 0.51 percentage point 
smaller VAT gap as percent of GDP. This suggests that doubling the share of card transactions in 
output would halve the share of VAT gap in output. As for the VAT gap as a percent of VTTL, 
the estimates show that a 1% rise in plastic money use is associated with a 7.6 percentage point 
improvement in compliance. Therefore, ceteris paribus, to halve the share of the VAT gap in the 
value-added total tax liability, plastic money use needs to increase by roughly 6.6%. The IV 
regression also reveals a strong positive and consistent effect of cash withdrawals on tax evasion 
across all the specifications. The results in column (2) indicates that a 1% rise in the share of cash 
withdrawals in output would lead to an approximately 0.43% increase in the VAT gap or roughly 
0.6% as percent of GDP. When expressed as a percent of the VTTL, a 1% increase in cash 
withdrawals is linked to a 4.3 percentage points increase in evasion. However, it should be noted 
that the estimated effect for the log specification in column (1) is negative yet not significant. A 
potential explanation for the difference in statistical significance to columns (2) and (3) is the fact 
the outcome in (1) is not normalized. Still, this imprecisely estimated, negative effect may not be 
entirely dismissed as null as it is not centered around zero. These findings are largely in line with 
Immordino and Russo (2018a) who reported that plastic money use improves VAT compliance. 
These results are in line with previous studies which found that cash withdrawals foster tax evasion 




It also appears that the productive structure of the economy is a key determinant of tax compliance. 
In fact, the IV estimates show that an increased share of the real estate sector in the total value 
added of the economy is associated with lower VAT gaps in all the three specifications. This could 
be explained by the fact that real estate transactions typically involve substantial amount of money 
in which case the use of cash is nearly prohibitive, if not actually outlawed. Moreover, those 
transactions involve extensive paper trail in the form of contracts and land registration.  
The results also show some large, positive and significant effect of the dispersion of tax rates on 
tax evasion. The greater the dispersion, the higher the benefits from a misapplication of reduced 
rates, which can widen the VAT compliance gap. The IV estimates also report large increases in 
the VAT gap by 4.15 percentage points of the GDP when the dispersion rate is increased by one 
unit. When considering an even narrower basis in VTTL, the effect is magnified further to 38 
percentage points of the VTTL. These results illustrate the importance of a singular VAT rate 
within EU countries as also highlighted in Hopland and Ullman (2019) for the case of Germany.  
Finally, the estimation reports a small, negative and significant association between the deficit to 
GDP ratio and VAT gaps, suggesting that a one-unit increase of the deficit to GDP ratio will 
decrease VAT gaps by 0.028 percentage points of the GDP. As stated earlier, ex ante efforts made 
by tax administrations to close the VAT gap can be driven by the level of public indebtedness. A 
higher level of deficit would likely pressure tax authorities to take measures that can have a 






There is evidence that card payments’ traceability could enhance VAT compliance by 
increasing the perceived probability of detection by the tax authorities which enhances the VAT’s 
deterrence effect (Pomeranz, 2015). This paper investigates the effect of payment methods on 
valued-added tax compliance in EU countries. It differs from most of the earlier works first by 
considering a more appropriate measure of the compliance gap that nets out the policy gap given 
that the entire gap is not made up of tax fraud or evasion. Therefore, a concern with most of these 
earlier studies is the use of VAT revenue or VRR as measure of tax revenue efficiency without 
controlling in the regressions for the effect of policy choices on tax structure, the enforcement 
capacity of the tax administration, etc. Some of these factors cannot even be easily accounted for 
when using aggregate level data, possibly leading to omitted variable bias issues in the estimates 
of those papers. Second, even though one of the previous works used the appropriate measures of 
VAT gap, it examines the effect of one means of payment at a time, a potential for omitted variable 
bias. In addition, using adequate measures of VAT compliance gap along with more recent data 
enables us to obtain updated estimates of the relationship between plastic money use and tax 
compliance. 
Using a fixed effect panel data estimation and IV techniques on 26 EU countries from 2000 
to 2016, it appears that card payments statistically positively affect tax revenue collection 
efficiency. At the antipodes of Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2020) and Madzharova 
(2020), the OLS results confirm Immordino and Russo (2018a) who find that plastic money use 
does not translate into more VAT revenue collection in a naïve OLS regression. In addition, this 
study corroborates Madzharova (2020) and Immordino and Russo (2018a) who report that cash 




argues that its approach provides a more adequate assessment of the relationship between plastic 
money use and VAT compliance gap relative to Immordino and Russo (2018a) by dealing 
simultaneously with both means of payments. It also explores a potential endogeneity problem 
inherent to the choice of a specific means of transactions, which could bias the cross-country 
analysis. In line with Immordino and Russo (2018a), this paper finds some evidence of the effect 
of credit and debit card payments on VAT compliance gap. These results suggest that the increased 
use of plastic money led to gains in consumption tax compliance. However, the non-significant 
result for the log specification may require further investigation. To completely close the debate 
on this topic, a future research program would require micro-level data or administrative records. 
In other fields, it has been documented that aggregate-level analyses might be limited in power to 
estimate statistically significant effects (Black et al, 2019). In addition, it would be interesting to 
explore the impact of the spike in the use of electronic forms of payments due to the exogenous 
shift in norms in response to COVID-19 which imposes confinement and social distancing. To 
investigate this, updated VAT gap estimates are needed once member countries’ national 
administrations release their respective end-of-year estimates. 
The results regarding the use of plastic money and especially cash transactions have 
potential wider policy implications for both national governments and European authorities. Cash 
transactions have the property of preserving the anonymity of the payer and recipient and so, 
despite their overall convenience, they can be used for fraudulent and criminal purposes. As 
aforementioned, the EU has investigated how cash transactions have not only contributed to 
fraudulent activities but also to financing terrorism (Europol, 2015). Imposing cash threshold 
limits has been already introduced in a number of EU countries to combat these problems, but the 




adversely affecting the effectiveness of those measures in any country, thus, the consideration of 
a uniform standard in the EU.9 Based on the adverse impact of (within-country) tax rate dispersion 
on VAT gaps, it could be argued that the application of a uniform VAT rate has the potential of 
generating very large reductions in the VAT gap. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that these EU-
based findings may very well be generalizable to other countries around the world since they are 










Appendix A. Effect of the FPEP on School Outcomes 
Table A.1. Test of Common Pre-Reform Trends Using Private Schools as Control 
  Log (6th Graders)   Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: All 
           
Public school * Year = 2005 0.0387 0.0802 0.0640 
 
0.0819 0.1308 0.0743 
 
0.0035 0.0024 -0.0027 
 
(0.071) (0.064) (0.061) 
 
(0.123) (0.144) (0.140) 
 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023) 
Public school * Year = 2006 0.0211 0.0211 -0.0071 
 
0.1313 0.1313 0.0654 
 
-0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0164 
 
(0.030) (0.036) (0.034) 
 
(0.085) (0.101) (0.092) 
 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
Public school * Year = 2007 0.0214 0.0214 0.0091 
 
0.0323 0.0323 0.0342 
 
0.0105 0.0105 0.0115 
 
(0.029) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
(0.063) (0.075) (0.080) 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.028) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
R-squared 0.817 0.994 0.994 
 
0.751 0.949 0.953 
 
0.553 0.755 0.757 
Panel B: Boys 
           
Public school * Year = 2005 0.0592 0.1112 0.1010 
 
0.0917 0.1443 0.0913 
 
0.0099 0.0087 0.0026 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.068) 
 
(0.132) (0.145) (0.142) 
 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
Public school * Year = 2006 0.0249 0.0249 0.0134 
 
0.1125 0.1125 0.0461 
 
-0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0179 
 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.037) 
 
(0.080) (0.095) (0.094) 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
Public school * Year = 2007 0.0396 0.0396 0.0394 
 
0.0034 0.0034 -0.0003 
 
0.0139 0.0139 0.0153 
 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.040) 
 
(0.059) (0.070) (0.078) 
 
(0.023) (0.028) (0.029) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
R-squared 0.798 0.993 0.993 
 
0.743 0.952 0.955 
 
0.551 0.740 0.743 
Panel C: Girls 
           
Public school * Year = 2005 0.0035 0.0344 0.0165 
 
0.0717 0.1151 0.0594 
 
-0.0016 -0.0028 -0.0064 
 
(0.078) (0.073) (0.071) 
 
(0.126) (0.151) (0.148) 
 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.027) 
Public school * Year = 2006 0.0103 0.0103 -0.0261 
 
0.1523 0.1523 0.0908 
 
-0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0102 
 
(0.043) (0.051) (0.056) 
 
(0.097) (0.115) (0.102) 
 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026) 
Public school * Year = 2007 0.0098 0.0098 -0.0103 
 
0.0714 0.0714 0.0793 
 
0.0104 0.0104 0.0108 
 
(0.048) (0.057) (0.059) 
 
(0.080) (0.094) (0.095) 
 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.033) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
R-squared 0.834 0.990 0.991   0.751 0.940 0.944   0.539 0.762 0.762 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by district, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, district, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of schools per enrollee, the count of classroom per student, and the 




Table A.2. Placebo Test of Common Pre-Reform Trends Using Private Schools as Control 
  Log (6th Graders)         Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All 
           
Public school * Post -0.019 -0.040 -0.024 
 
-0.091 -0.115 -0.053 
 
0.009 0.010 0.015 
 
(0.038) (0.041) (0.037) 
 
(0.076) (0.092) (0.086) 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
District trends No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
School type-district FE No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
R-squared 0.817 0.993 0.994 
 
0.751 0.949 0.952 
 
0.553 0.755 0.756 
Panel B: Boys 
           
Public school * Post -0.022 -0.048 -0.038 
 
-0.100 -0.127 -0.069 
 
0.009 0.009 0.015 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.040) 
 
(0.076) (0.091) (0.085) 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
District trends No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
School type-district FE No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
R-squared 0.798 0.992 0.992 
 
0.743 0.952 0.955 
 
0.549 0.739 0.742 
Panel C: Girls 
           
Public school * Post -0.002 -0.017 -0.001 
 
-0.077 -0.098 -0.035 
 
0.009 0.01 0.014 
 
(0.041) (0.047) (0.044) 
 
(0.082) (0.100) (0.093) 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
Controls No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
District trends No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
School type-district FE No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
 
327 327 327 
R-squared 0.834 0.990 0.991   0.751 0.94 0.944   0.539 0.761 0.762 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, district, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 






Table A.3. Effect on Demand Using Private Schools as Control – Negative Binomial 
  6th Graders Graduates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: All 
   
Public school * Post 0.2385*** 0.2500*** 0.1540** 0.1505** 
 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.063) (0.060) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School type-district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1061 1061 1061 1061 
Panel B: Boys 
   
Public school * Post 0.2465*** 0.2590*** 0.1583*** 0.1575*** 
 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.059) (0.057) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School type-district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1061 1061 1061 1061 
Panel C: Girls 
   
Public school * Post 0.2420*** 0.2508*** 0.1701** 0.1563** 
 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.074) (0.069) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School type-district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1061 1061 1061 1061 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, district, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 






Table A.4. Effect on Supply Using Private Schools as Control – Negative Binomial 
  Schools Classrooms Teachers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public school * Post 0.4769*** 0.4077*** 0.3499*** 0.3202*** 0.3434*** 0.3288*** 
 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) 
District trends   No   Yes   No   Yes   No   Yes 
School type-district FE   No   Yes   No   Yes   No   Yes 
Observations 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, district, and year fixed effects. Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
 
Table A.5. Test of Common Pre-Reform Trends Across Prefectures and School Type 
  Log (6th Graders)   Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Panel A: All 
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Panel B: Boys 
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Panel C: Girls 
        
Intensity*Private 
        


































        











































R-squared 0.875 0.889   0.800 0.815   0.596 0.610 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, prefecture, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 






Table A.6. Placebo Test of Common Pre-Reform Trends Across Prefectures and School Type 
  Log (6th Graders)   Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Panel A: All 
        





































Panel B: Boys 
        





































Panel C: Girls 
        
































R-squared 0.874 0.888   0.794 0.811   0.585 0.598 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, prefecture, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 





Table A.7. Effect on Demand Across Prefectures and School Type – Negative Binomial 
  6th Graders   Graduates 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Panel A: All 
    














Controls No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Observations 880 880 
 
880 880 
Panel B: Boys 
    














Controls No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Observations 880 880 
 
880 880 
Panel C: Girls 
    














Controls No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Observations 880 880   880 880 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, prefecture, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 





Table A.8. Effect on Demand Across Prefectures and School Type – Average Enrollment Rates 
  Log (6th Graders)   Log (Graduates)   Graduation Rate 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Panel A: All 
       





































Panel B: Boys 
       





































Panel C: Girls 
       
































R-squared 0.865 0.872   0.818 0.824   0.482 0.488 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, prefecture, and year fixed effects. Control variables include the number of school per student, the count of classroom per student, and the 





Table A.9. Effect on Supply Across Prefectures and School Type – Negative Binomial 
  Schools Classrooms Teachers 
Intensity*Post*Private 0.0019 0.0027 0.0093** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Intensity*Post*Public 0.0148*** 0.0139*** 0.0134*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 880 880 880 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 
dummy, prefecture, and year fixed effects. Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
Table A.10. Effect on Supply Across Prefectures and School Type – Average Enrollment Rates 
Panel A Log (Schools) Log (Classrooms) Log (Teachers) 
Intensity*Post*Private 0.0020 0.0033 0.0049 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Intensity*Post*Public 0.0147*** 0.0140*** 0.0135*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 880 880 880 
R-squared 0.836 0.845 0.837 
    
Panel B School/student Classroom/student Teacher/student 
Intensity*Post*Private -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intensity*Post*Public -0.0000 -0.0001* -0.0001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 880 880 880 
R-squared 0.663 0.566 0.21 
Pre-reform mean 0.006 0.028 0.027 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include public school 




Appendix B. Effect of the FPEP on Child Labor 
Table B.1. Effect on Child Non-Economic Activities 
  All Children Boys Girls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treat*Post -0.0391** -0.0355* -0.0255 -0.0257 -0.0512* -0.0491* 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) 
Treat 0.0500*** 0.0464*** 0.0439*** 0.0478*** 0.0526*** 0.0530*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) 
Girl  0.0475***     
  (0.007)     
Son or daughter of the household head  -0.0033  -0.0013  -0.0052 
  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.015) 
Genitrix lives in the household  -0.0249**  -0.0201**  -0.0286* 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
Mother's education level  0.0208**  0.0311***  0.0090 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Education level of the household head  -0.0049  -0.0063  -0.0036 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Wealth index score  -0.0162**  -0.0235**  -0.0077 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
Log(Size of the household)  -0.0029  0.0121  -0.0186 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.015) 
Rural area  -0.0008  -0.0116  0.0128 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.016) 
Observations 19057 19057 9673 9673 9384 9384 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include prefecture, 









Table B.2. Effect on Child Economic Activities 
  All Children Boys Girls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treat*Post 0.0200 0.0120 0.0314 0.0282 0.0117 -0.0009 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.052) (0.052) 
Treat 0.1348*** 0.1234*** 0.1349*** 0.1391*** 0.1316*** 0.1414*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.028) (0.016) (0.024) 
Girl  -0.0013     
  (0.011)     
Son or daughter of the household head  -0.0075  -0.0087  -0.0048 
  (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
Genitrix lives in the household  -0.0068  -0.0129  0.0002 
  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Mother's education level  -0.0168  -0.0105  -0.0221** 
  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.011) 
Education level of the household head  -0.0219***  -0.0135  -0.0290*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Wealth index score  -0.0468***  -0.0645***  -0.0310* 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
Log(Size of the household)  0.0415***  0.0299**  0.0512*** 
  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
Rural area  0.0509**  0.0493**  0.0529* 
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
Observations 19096 19096 9695 9695 9401 9401 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include prefecture, 












Appendix C. Impact of Plastic Money Use on VAT Compliance 




Variables Source Max Min Mean Std. Dev. N 
VAT gap (in EUR million) 2013 & 2018 TAXUD report 40424 20 5630.30 8652.70 442 
VAT gap as % of VTTL 2018 TAXUD report 49 0 16.4522 10.2644 442 
VAT gap as % of GDP 2018 TAXUD report 7.9 0 1.5903 1.2437 442 
Card payments as % of GDP European Central Bank 0.46 0.001 0.11 0.08 437 
ATM cash withdrawals as % of GDP European Central Bank 0.30 0.01 0.13 0.06 413 
Number of ATM per million inhabitants European Central Bank 1667.63 33.46 666.59 333.98 441 
Share of whole and retail sale in VA (%) Eurostat 32.35 10.03 20.85 3.64 442 
Share of real estate in VA (%) Eurostat 19.13 4.91 9.34 2.46 442 
Share of construction in VA (%) Eurostat 12.66 1.02 6.22 1.71 442 
Share of industry in VA (%) Eurostat 38.58 6.15 21.33 5.6 442 
Share of telecommunication in VA (%) Eurostat 10.59 3.02 4.84 1.07 442 
Share of arts in VA (%) Eurostat 14.57 1.4 3.07 1.41 442 
Dispersion of tax rates Authors, 2018 TAXUD report 0.12 0 0.07 0.03 442 
Scale of the tax administration OECD 0.01 0 0 0 304 
IT expenditure over total administrative costs OECD 0.29 0 0.1 0.07 208 
Unemployment rate (%) Eurostat 27.5 1.8 8.86 4.35 442 
Government effectiveness index World Bank 2.35 -0.37 1.17 0.62 416 
Broadband Internet subscriptions for 100 people World Bank 43.10 0.01 18.96 12.13 425 
Age structure (%) Eurostat 43.2 25.7 35.15 3.37 442 
Deficit to GDP ratio as % of GDP Eurostat 6.9 -32.1 -2.65 3.66 442 
GDP per capita (in EUR) Eurostat 91300 1800 23655.91 16068.98 440 
Population (in million) Eurostat 82.53 0.39 19.02 23.02 442 




Table C.2. FE Panel Regression of VAT Gap Including CEE Country Dummy 
  Log (VAT gap) VAT gap as % of GDP VAT gap as % of VTTL 
Log(Card payments as % of GDP) 0.0482 0.0734 0.1030 0.4390 0.5584 4.2218 
 
(0.137) (0.320) (0.155) (0.276) (1.566) (2.594) 
Log(ATM cash withdrawals as % of GDP) -0.0887 -0.0863 -0.1500 -0.1119 -2.5835 -2.2439 
 
(0.224) (0.228) (0.140) (0.151) (1.654) (1.740) 













Share of whole and retail sale in VA (%) -0.0148 -0.0152 -0.0562 -0.0617 0.0526 0.0064 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.056) (0.054) (0.391) (0.377) 
Share of real estate in VA (%) -0.0614 -0.0619 -0.0195 -0.0271 -0.1995 -0.2761 
 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) (0.510) (0.503) 
Share of arts in VA (%) -0.0754 -0.0780 0.0347 0.0066 0.0372 -0.3384 
 
(0.064) (0.075) (0.055) (0.057) (0.530) (0.584) 
Dispersion of tax rates -0.7873 -0.8202 2.5325 2.1210 26.1645 21.3974 
 
(1.814) (1.806) (1.940) (1.859) (18.965) (18.681) 
Unemployment rate 0.0241 0.0240 0.0554** 0.0526** 0.4771** 0.4628** 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025) (0.206) (0.210) 
Age structure 0.0750 0.0750 0.1367** 0.1369** 1.0273* 1.0295* 
 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.060) (0.561) (0.567) 
Deficit to GDP ratio as % of GDP -0.0297 -0.0297 -0.0323* -0.0328* -0.3296* -0.3217* 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.176) (0.177) 
Log(Population) -0.3827 -0.4238 1.0475 0.2753 8.0680 2.1029 
 
(2.548) (2.570) (1.728) (1.739) (17.840) (18.689) 







Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 412 412 412 412 412 412 
R-squared 0.317 0.317 0.314 0.318 0.286 0.292 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, share of telecommunications 











      
Log(# ATM per million inhabitants) 0.270*** 0.684*** 
 
(0.0797) (0.0803) 
Broadband 0.0586*** -0.0491** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0199) 
Log(# ATM per million inhabitants)*Broadband -0.00944*** 0.00667** 
 
(0.00207) (0.00294) 
Bank Branches per 100 km2 0.103* 0.143** 
 (0.0605) (0.0627) 
Log(#ATM per million inhabitants)*Bank Branches per 100 km2 -0.00912 -0.0211** 
 (0.00899) (0.00952) 
   
R-squared 0.948 0.885 
Observations 400 395 
Number of countries 25 25 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of whole and retail sale in VA, share of real estate in VA, share of 
construction in VA, share of industry in VA, share of telecommunications in VA, share of arts, dispersion rate, unemployment rate, age structure, 
deficit to GDP ratio, Log(population), Log(GDP per capita), and the constant term. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.  
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